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ANGELICA C. ROMERO

Model Rule 8.4(d): Proposing a New Supporting
Comment
ABSTRACT
Despite the enduring history of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
the maintenance of these Rules draws advocates and scholars to consider the
study of human behavior. Maintaining the integrity of the profession has not
been easy, yet maintaining the integrity of the profession has been preserved
as a vital keystone to the Rules. In fact, discouraging misconduct within the
legal profession has been a constant endeavor because society has demanded
that advocates strive to produce a life of service that is above reproach. In
recognizing the study of human behavior in the practice of law, this
Comment proposes a new supporting comment for Model Rule 8.4(d).
Though reflecting on human behavior in the practice of law is not novel,
drafting a supporting comment with the psychology of Man in mind may be
helpful now that prejudicial conduct and the administration of justice have
developed unruly parameters. After August 2016, Model Rule 8.4(d) was left
without a supporting comment to accommodate Model Rule 8.4(g) changes.
Notwithstanding the American Bar Association’s (ABA) efforts to alleviate
the strongholds of discrimination, some have come to believe that Model
Rule 8.4(d) is far too broad and should be eliminated in favor of Model Rule
8.4(g)’s introduction. However, that would be a mistake.
This Comment proposes that paragraph (d) can find true meaning by
considering psychological theories found in the study of human behavior.
Some of these theories include situationism, heuristics, and various decisionmaking processes. Situationism challenges attorneys to evaluate their
decision-making processes or methods as they are often ruled by
unpredictable situations. Similarly, heuristics invite attorneys to confront the
harms of using shortcuts. Though the practice of law often demands
efficiency, it should never be at the expense of a client or the reputation of
the profession. With these theories in mind, this Comment proposes a new
supporting comment that gives Model Rule 8.4(d) a fresh perspective on how
to evaluate when an attorney is engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
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COMMENT
MODEL RULE 8.4(d): PROPOSING A NEW SUPPORTING COMMENT
Angelica C. Romero†
I. INTRODUCTION
The law is full of uncertainty. Though the law and its advocates strive to
maintain standards into perpetuity, change is inevitable. Advancements in
the law are often promulgated by external influences that press for its change.
This is true even within legal ethics. Though riddled with uncertainty,
understanding that attorneys are subject to external influences is important
to understanding the practice of law. However, to some, attempting to
understand the “soft” side of the law may be as idle as grasping for the wind.
Nevertheless, it is important that attorneys, judges, and even disciplinary
bodies understand the impact of human behavior in the practice of law. As
“social engineers,” attorneys know that the legal profession is more than just
knowing rules and regulations. Instead, the legal profession is composed of
deal-making, favors, temptations, strategies, and rivalries. Therefore,
maintaining the integrity of the profession may not always be easy.
Since 2016, Model Rule 8.4(d) has not had a supporting comment.1 As
such, this Comment proposes that the ABA add a supporting comment that
considers various psychological explanations of human behavior.
Accordingly, in drafting a new supporting comment, the legal profession
ought to be mindful that attorneys are subject to a wide variety of tendencies
that may not always be facially unethical. Because the history of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct is important, Part II provides a brief
history of these Rules and how maintaining the integrity of the profession has
been an enduring maxim since 1908. Part II also provides a brief discussion
of the various psychological explanations and theories that help to “quantify”
human behavior.
Part III provides a brief survey of Model Rule 8.4(d) and four state case
†
Managing Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 16; J.D. Candidate, Liberty
University School of Law (2022); Master of Legal Studies, Arizona State University (2019);
Master of Public Administration, University of Arizona (2016); B.S., magna cum laude,
Public Management and Policy, University of Arizona (2014). The author thanks Angel R.
“Gelato” Romero III, Dr. Mary A. Innabi, and her family for being constant sources of
support.
1
Supporting comments are placed at the end of each Model Rule to provide guidance in
applying the Rule. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT Preamble & Scope ¶¶14–15 (AM. BAR.
ASS’N 2020).
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studies that implement the Rule. The case studies include Wisconsin,
Washington, Louisiana, and North Carolina. Each state represents a
particular variation of how paragraph (d) has been adopted by the states. Part
III provides in-depth psychology-based explanations of misconduct and their
tie to each case study. Part IV sets forth the proposed supporting comment
for paragraph (d). Lastly, Part V concludes with some basic principles
mentioned throughout this Comment. In sum, this Comment introduces a
fresh way of framing a new supporting comment for Model 8.4(d) by making
space for the uncertainties of human nature.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

A Brief History: ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct

It was a Wednesday morning in late August of 1905. Lawyers from across
the nation had gathered at Hotel Mathewson in Narragansett Pier, Rhode
Island, to hold the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the ABA.2 After being
introduced as the new ABA president, Henry St. George Tucker3 addressed
the gentlemen of the ABA and quoted President Theodore Roosevelt in an
attempt to “charge” the Association to inquire into “whether the ethics of
[the] profession rise to the high standard which its position of influence in
the country demands.”4
In response to Tucker’s impassioned commission, M.F. Dickinson of
Massachusetts spoke for the Committee on Legal Ethics to offer a resolution
that called for “a committee of five [to] be appointed . . . to report at the next
meeting” concerning “the adoption of a code of professional ethics by [the]
Association.”5 Amasa M. Eaton of Rhode Island was pleased to second the

2

Transactions of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association,
Held at Narragansett Pier, Rhode Island, August 23, 24 and 25, 1905, 28 ANN. REP. A.B.A., at
3 (1905) [hereinafter Transactions of A.B.A. Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting].
3
Id.
4
Henry St. George Tucker, A.B.A. President, Address of the President at the TwentyEighth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 28 ANN. REP. A.B.A., at 299, 383–
84 (1905).
5
Transactions of A.B.A. Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting, supra note 2, at 131–32.
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resolution,6 which was favorably adopted.7 For the first time in ABA history,
a code of ethics would be introduced to the legal profession.
At the following Meeting in 1906, the Committee on Code of Professional
Ethics presented a report that determined the advisability and practicability
of the ABA adopting a code of professional ethics.8 By adopting a code of
ethics states would be compelled to support the United States Constitution
and the chosen standards of ethics to “promote the administration of justice
and uphold the honor of the profession.”9 In its Report, the Committee
commended Alabama for having already established statutes addressing
unethical behavior.10 A few decades earlier, on December 14, 1887, the
Alabama State Bar Association adopted a code of ethics, written by Judge
Thomas Goode Jones.11 Similar to the proceedings of the ABA 1905 Meeting,
Judge Jones had recommended that the Alabama State Bar “appoint a
committee . . . to report a Code of Legal Ethics for consideration at the
[following] annual meeting.”12 This Code went on to be adopted by eleven
other states before the ABA established the Canons of Professional Ethics.13
Finally, in 1908, the new Association president, Jacob M. Dickinson of
Illinois, presented the report of the Committee on Canons of Ethics.14
Though Dickinson did not intend to persuade anyone to adopt the Canons,
he did state the importance of its adoption by noting that three days was “a
rather unusual [amount of] time for gentlemen from various parts of the
country to devote to a work of that character.”15 Those on the Committee
“felt that it was one of the most important works that the American Bar
6
Id. at 132. In addition to Amasa M. Eaton participating in committee motions and
resolutions on that Wednesday morning, he also happened to be one of the committee
members hosting the annual meeting that year. See id. at 3, 132. In fact, William H.
Sweetland, of Rhode Island, began the meeting with a few exhortations on behalf of the
Rhode Island Bar Association. Id. at 3–6. Little did Eaton or Sweetland know that though
“[Rhode Island is] a small state, and . . . make[s] but a very small spot upon a quite large
map” it would host a meeting marked by history for imparting one of the ABA’s greatest
legacies—the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at 4.
7
Id. at 132.
8
Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 29 ANN. REP. A.B.A., at 600
(1906).
9
Id. at 602–03.
10
Id. at 603.
11
Walter Burgwyn Jones, First Legal Code of Ethics Adopted in the United States, 8 A.B.A.
J. 111, 111 (1922).
12
Id.
13
Id. at 113.
14
John Hinkley, Transactions of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association Held at Seattle, Washington, 31 ANN. REP. A.B.A, at 3, 55 (1908).
15
Id. at 55–56.
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Association could ever undertake.”16 The Report itself included a Preamble,
thirty-two Canons, and an Oath of Admission.17 Also, with this Report, the
ABA recommended that the “subject of professional ethics be taught in all
law schools, and that all candidates for admission to the Bar be examined
thereon.”18 As a result, 1908 would mark the beginning of the Bar’s devoted
pursuit to uphold the excellence of the legal profession by adopting high
ethical standards.
By 1935, thirty years after M.F. Dickinson introduced a resolution of legal
ethics, the Association, in addition to the Canons for practicing attorneys,
had adopted Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1924,19 and the Canons had grown
from thirty-two to forty-six.20 Even with these landmark amendments, the
Canons of Professional Ethics would undergo another proposed major
overhaul thirty years later. In 1965, the ABA president, Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
addressed the Bar and thought it appropriate to reflect on the state of the legal
profession.21 He made compelling remarks concerning the growth and
competency of the legal profession; however, he also disquietedly harped on
the public’s opinions and misconceptions of lawyers.22 Powell believed that
much of the public’s concern was rooted in the profession’s “failure to
conform to ethical standards and to maintain adequate professional
discipline.”23 Powell outlined three major objectives that the Association
would focus on for the year, one of which included “a comprehensive reevaluation of the ethical standards of [the] profession.”24
Even though Powell may have only intended for his Address to exhort the
attendees of the Eighty-Eighth Annual Meeting, the “damage” had been
done. This time the legal profession did not have to wait another thirty years.
Following Powell’s request, the House of Delegates adopted the Model Code
16

Id. at 56.
Final Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 31 ANN. REP. A.B.A, at
567, 575–85 (1908).
18
Id. at 573.
19
Canons of Judicial Ethics, in Proceedings of the Fifty-Eighth Annual Meeting of
American Bar Association Los Angeles, California, 58 ANN. REP. A.B.A., at 57, 697 (1935).
20
Id. at 691–95. “The supplemental canons, 33–45, were adopted at its Fifty-first Annual
Meeting at Seattle, Washington, on July 26, 1928. Canons 11, 13, 34, 35 and 43 were
amended, and Canon 46 was adopted at its Fifty-sixth Annual Meeting at Grand Rapids,
Michigan, on August 31, 1933.” Id. at 683 n.*.
21
Lewis F. Powell Jr., A.B.A. President, The State of the Legal Profession, Address at the
Eighty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 90 ANN. REP. A.B.A., at 391
(1965).
22
Id. at 392.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 392–93.
17
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of Professional Responsibility on August 12, 1969, and later amended the
Code in February 1970.25 This new Code replaced the Canons of Professional
Ethics.
Despite the Model Code of 1970 replacing the Canons, its structure
continued to reflect the spirit of the original Canons.26 Finally, in August
1983, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct were approved and replaced
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.27 In the Chairman’s
introduction of the new Model Rules, he commended the late Robert J. Kutak
who led the charge of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standard to evaluate “whether existing standards of professional conduct
provided comprehensive and consistent guidance for resolving the
increasingly complex ethical problems in the practice of law.”28
Despite undergoing several amendments since 1983, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct have stood the test of time. Yet time would further
prod the standards of legal ethics and challenge states to address misconduct.
For in 2016, Model Rule 8.4(d) would lose its supporting comment to create
Model Rule 8.4(g).29
B.

Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession

Though the “incorrigible” may seek to escape the influences of a system
that strives to encourage honor and integrity, “the high position of trust and
confidence that the lawyer must occupy to the public” demands an exaction.30
This sentiment—to maintain the integrity of the profession—is what seems
to have drawn Henry St. George Tucker and M.F. Dickinson to resolve and
introduce a code of legal ethics to the profession. However, this is not to say
that the primary purpose of high ethical standards is to punish the
“incorrigible.”31 The main point is that maintaining the integrity of the
25

Preface and Title Page to MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
See generally MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. Canons 1–9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
27
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 108
ANN. REP. A.B.A., at 1214 (1983).
28
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 108 ANN. REP. A.B.A., at 1219 (1983).
29
Myles V. Lynk, Changes to Model Rule 8.4, 2016 A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS &
PRO. RESP. REP. 109.
30
Tucker, supra note 4, at 388–89.
31
In re Vaughan, 209 P. 353, 355 (Cal. 1922) (“[I]t has been said the disbarment of
attorneys is not intended for the punishment of the individual but for the protection of the
courts and the legal profession.”); see also 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 cmt. 3 (2017) (“The
purpose of professional discipline for misconduct is not punishment, but to protect the
public, the courts, and the legal profession. Lawyer discipline affects only the lawyer’s license
to practice law.”); Janine C. Ogando, Note, Sanctioning Unfit Lawyers: The Need for Public
Protection, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 459 n.1 (1992) (“[T]he primary purpose of attorney
26
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profession is truly at the heart of the Model Rules, in that it has been
preserved with the passage of each new set of ABA ethical standards.
For example, in the final report containing the 1908 Canons of
Professional Ethics, Canon 29 encouraged that a lawyer “should strive at all
times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and
to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.”32 Then, in
1969, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, under sections EC 1-1
and DR 1-101, conferred an ethical responsibility upon all lawyers to
“maintain[] the integrity and improv[e] the competence of the bar to meet
the highest standards” of professionalism.33 The tenet of maintaining the
integrity of the profession was again preserved in 1983 under the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct.34 Even today, 112 years later, maintaining the
integrity of the profession continues to serve as a foundational premise in
legal ethics.35
1.

Defining Misconduct

For purposes of Model Rule 8.4, misconduct consists of conduct that an
attorney may engage during practice. Attorney conduct “includes
representing clients; interacting with . . . coworkers, court personnel, lawyers
and others while engaged in the practice of law; operating or managing a law
firm or law practice; and participating in bar association, business or social
activities in connection with the practice of law.”36 In the broader context of
attorney conduct, misconduct’s expansive definition allows states to cast a
wider net when addressing attorney misconduct. Though this may seem ideal
for accountability purposes, it also encourages “incorrigibles” to frame
misconduct as mere conduct.
Model Rule 8.4 is often referred to as a “catch-all” provision that outlines
various categories of misconduct subject to disciplinary action.37 Therefore,
defining misconduct under Model Rule 8.4 involves a list of allusive points
of reference. This approach allows for a wide range of offensive misconduct
to be covered and prevents any “technical manipulation of a rule stated more
narrowly.”38 Nevertheless, by definition, it is professional misconduct for a
discipline is not the punishment of the attorney; it is the protection of the public, the
profession, and the courts.” (quoting In re Nadrich, 747 P.2d 1146, 1148 (Cal. 1988))).
32
Final Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, supra note 17, at 583.
33
MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
34
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 28, at 1311.
35
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
36
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
37
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWS § 5 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2000).
38
Id.
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lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or
do so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer
in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a
government agency or official or to achieve results by
means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law;
(f) . . . ; or
(g) engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know is harassment or discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity,
marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct
related to the practice of law.39
Defining
misconduct
involves
“subjective
and
idiosyncratic
considerations,”40 which make the outcome of disciplinary proceedings less
predictable. Misconduct within the profession not only has the potential to
become unruly because of a lack of integrity but also because courts often
weigh different factors outside its jurisdiction’s professional rules.41 This
Comment focuses specifically on misconduct under Model Rule 8.4(d)—
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
2.

What Does “Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice”
Mean?42

Presently, conduct that is “prejudicial to the administration of justice”
depends on each state’s interpretation, which may include various “ad hoc”
methods.43 The use of ad hoc methods developed after Model Rule 8.4(d)’s
39
40
41
42
43

MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (emphasis added).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWS § 5 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2000).
Id.
It depends.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWS § 5 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2000).
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supporting comment was absorbed by Model Rule 8.4(g) in 2016, which left
Model Rule 8.4(d) without a supporting comment. Despite the ABA’s
glorified renovation, some states retained a supporting comment for their
version of paragraph (d).44 Prior to August 2016, conduct that was prejudicial
to the administration of justice occurred when a lawyer “knowingly”
manifested a certain bias or prejudice based on “race, sex, religion, national
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.”45 Though
Model Rule 8.4(d)’s previous comment offered a smorgasbord of conduct
that constituted prejudicial misconduct in the administration of justice, it
lacked specificity, and served as a “catch-all” for misconduct that did not fit
other sections of Model Rule 8.4. The previous comment highlighted
prejudicial conduct, but it seemed to presume the meaning of the
administration of justice, which allowed the ABA to change the comment
into a black letter rule by simply focusing on prejudicial conduct. By
narrowing the comment’s scope to prejudices that only addressed paragraph
(g), the ABA inevitably eliminated paragraph (d)’s comment and broadened
paragraph (d)’s meaning.
In general, Model Rule 8.4(d) allows clients, colleagues, and concerned
judges to initiate disciplinary proceedings against attorneys for harassment
and discrimination.46 However, Model Rule 8.4(d) is also addressed in cases
involving prejudicial conduct, whether in the context of a constitutional right
or a mere dissatisfaction with an attorney’s conduct.47 Yet, despite some states
declining to adopt paragraph (d),48 issues still arise that would otherwise be
addressed by paragraph (d) and its supporting comment.
C.

How Psychology Helps to Explain Attorney Misconduct

In 1879, to assist young barristers, Richard Harris, a reputable legal
scholar, offered several “Hints” regarding the “Art of Advocacy” in his historic
book, Hints on Advocacy: Conduct of Cases Civil and Criminal, Classes of
Witnesses, and Suggestions for Cross-Examining Them, Etc., Etc.49 Harris took
issue with the fact that “[t]he newly-called Barrister has to find his way as he
best can, very often to the sacrifice of important interests and many

44

Lynk, supra note 29, at 5–6.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“[Conduct] in the
course of representing a client.”).
46
See cases cited infra Section III.B.
47
Id.
48
See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:8.4.
49
See RICHARD HARRIS, HINTS ON ADVOCACY: CONDUCT OF CASES CIVIL AND CRIMINAL,
CLASSES OF WITNESSES, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR CROSS-EXAMINING THEM, ETC., ETC., at xi–xii
(London, Stevens & Sons 7th ed. 1884) (1879) [hereinafter HINTS ON ADVOCACY 7th ed.].
45
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unfortunate clients.”50 As one of his majesty’s counsel, Harris managed to
articulate and even candidly admit that advocacy is similar to an art form.51
Harris thought it “lamentable that no instruction [would] ever be given in an
art which requires an almost infinite amount of knowledge.”52 Harris’s work
is profound and telling because it was one of the first of its kind to offer
instruction to young barristers,53 and because it shared practical and implicit
strategies concerning the practice of law. One such strategy considers the
implications of human behavior.
Harris not only made it his aim to ensure that future advocates would
strategically apply the rules of advocacy,54 but he also understood that “[a]n
advocate is always dealing with human nature.”55 Harris’s work56 stressed that
“knowledge of human nature or human character is the key to success.”57
Moreover, “To treat mankind as mere machines, as some advocates
occasionally do, is to show an utter absence of that knowledge, which is often
the last acquirement but always the first necessity of an advocate.”58 Harris
highlighted that competent advocacy requires an advocate to not only
acknowledge the effects of human nature and “probe[] the mind and
character”59 of colleagues, witnesses, and the jury but also acquire the
requisite knowledge and “Common Sense, [which is] invaluable in all human
pursuits.”60
50

Id. at xi.
See RICHARD HARRIS, HINTS ON ADVOCACY: CONDUCT OF CASES CIVIL AND CRIMINAL,
CLASSES OF WITNESSES, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR CROSS-EXAMINING THEM, ETC., ETC., at iii–iv
(London, Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 12th ed. 1903) (1879) [hereinafter HINTS ON ADVOCACY 12th
ed.].
52
Id. at iii.
53
HINTS ON ADVOCACY 7th ed., supra note 49, at xi (“There is no SCHOOL OF ADVOCACY:
there are no LECTURES ON ADVOCACY; and so far as I have been able to ascertain, there is no
book on the subject.”).
54
See HINTS ON ADVOCACY 12th ed., supra note 51, at iv–v.
55
RICHARD HARRIS, HINTS ON ADVOCACY: CONDUCT OF CASES CIVIL AND CRIMINAL,
CLASSES OF WITNESSES, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR CROSS-EXAMINING THEM, ETC., ETC. 3 (London,
Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 17th ed. 1937) [hereinafter HINTS ON ADVOCACY 17th ed.] (emphasis
added).
56
Since Harris’s first edition of HINTS ON ADVOCACY in 1879, his work has consistently
been re-published for the past 140 years, making it one of the most “culturally important”
pieces of legal literature. See RICHARD HARRIS, HINTS ON ADVOCACY (Wentworth Press 2019)
(explaining how scholars agree that Harris’s work has been important enough to reproduce
and preserve over the years).
57
HINTS ON ADVOCACY 17th ed., supra note 55, at 3.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
51

112

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:1

Harris appeared highly aware of the implications and explanations
psychology provided concerning human behavior and even acknowledged its
uncertainty. In an effort to articulate advocacy’s application and tactics,
Harris conceded that “[n]either LAW nor HUMAN NATURE is an exact
science.”61 When considering human actors, an attorney can neither calculate
nor determine with certainty the outcome of any particular situation.62
Though Harris specifically used the jury as an example to outline the
contours of human nature, no person could be considered a “machine into
which [an attorney] could thrust . . . facts at one end and take them out in the
shape of a [calculated outcome] at the other, [otherwise] all difficulties would
vanish.”63
Harris challenged the legal profession to understand what it means to be a
true advocate and to exhort attorneys to understand the incalculable.
Understanding the psychology behind human behavior would be but a mere
complementary good to an attorney’s efforts in understanding the law. Like
the law, the psychology behind human behavior should not be discounted
simply because its application and awareness are not yet commonplace in the
practice of law.
This Comment aims to integrate various theories of psychology to help
explain Model Rule 8.4(d). Relying on principles of psychology to explain
human behavior may serve as a baseline to understand why misconduct
occurs. It may even redeem the “incorrigible.” Often, misconduct is a slippery
slope that most attorneys never intended to entertain. In fact, most attorneys
may have arrived at misconduct through incremental progressions of
objectively reasonable conduct. In the aggregate, innocent conduct can
culminate into an unwieldy beast of unethical behavior. So, how does an
attorney get there?
This Comment focuses on three major psychological theories that may
help explain why attorney behavior leads to unethical conduct. The first
theory is situationism. In general, “People are . . . prone to underestimate the
extent to which changes in [a] particular circumstance[] or environment
confronting [an] individual might significantly change his or her behavior.”64
There seems to be a “dynamic relationship between [a] person and [a]
situation in determining human behavior.”65 Therefore, “seemingly small
61

Id. at 309.
See id.
63
HINTS ON ADVOCACY 17th ed., supra note 55, at 310.
64
Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Two Social Psychologists’ Reflections on Situationism
and the Criminal Justice System, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 612, 613 (Jon Hanson
ed., 2012).
65
Id. at 612.
62
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and subtle manipulations of the social situation often have much larger
effects on behavior than most lay observers would predict.”66 In turn, “those
effects . . . are likely to ‘swamp’ the impact of previously observed or
measured individual differences in personality, values, or temperament.”67
Situationism explains how a person’s behavior may be influenced by
extraneous or even incidental factors, rather than personality traits,
background, and prior experiences.
The second addresses decision-making theories. In this Comment,
decision-making approaches and strategies are framed in terms of
structuring mechanisms, emotional dispositions, and group contexts.
Decision-making is often made absent full information, as gathering
information to make an “informed” decision may be costly and timeconsuming for attorneys and those in similar professions.68 Because attorneys
are constantly making decisions for themselves, superiors, and clients,69 it is
important to understand its implication on unethical behavior.
The third theory focuses on heuristics. A law student or advocate need not
know the definition of a heuristic to spot or even practice its methodology.
In layman’s terms, a heuristic is a “judgment shortcut.”70 Though “many
definitions of heuristics exist,” the term is of Greek origin, meaning, “serving
to find out or discover.”71 Heuristics has served and contributed to several
ever-developing fields,72 including the practice of law. In short, a heuristic “is
a strategy that ignores part[s] of information, with the goal of making
decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex
methods.”73
These psychological theories will serve as guideposts in developing a new
supporting comment to Model Rule 8.4(d). Because the study of human
behavior and the practice of law are “occasionally” incalculable and require
subtle, but necessary recalibrations from time to time, it is possible that
increased awareness of one may help guide the other. In addition to the
66

Id. at 615.
Id.
68
JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS:
UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING
86 (2012).
69
See id. at 85.
70
See id. at 67.
71
Gerd Gigerenzer & Wolfgang Gaissmaier, Heuristic Decision Making, 62 ANN. REV. OF
PSYCH. 451, 454 (2011).
72
Id. (“Einstein included the term, [heuristics], in the title of his Nobel prize-winning
paper from 1905 on quantum physics, indicating that the view he presented was incomplete
but highly useful.”).
73
Id.
67
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ABA’s efforts to maintain the integrity of the profession and to honor
paragraph (d)’s application within the legal profession, this Comment offers
a fresh perspective with the help of a few psychological theories. The theories
are not meant to offer a comprehensive view of conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice but only serve as reference points for attorneys,
judges, clients, and those thirsting for guidance; just as Harris may have
anticipated.
III. UNDERSTANDING MODEL RULE 8.4(d)
Model Rule 8.4(d) is best understood by considering its development
throughout the states and the states’ specific applications of paragraph (d).
Further, offering psychology-based explanations to human behavior may
help explain and provide a clearer interpretation of paragraph (d). Finally,
drafting a new supporting comment with psychology-based explanations in
mind is appropriate because of psychology’s ongoing impact on the practice
of law.
A.

The States and Model Rule 8.4(d)

To understand the implications of Model Rule 8.4(d), it is important to
first consider a brief survey of the various approaches states have taken in
adopting this Rule. As a point of reference, prior to August 2016, the ABA’s
supporting comment to Model Rule 8.4(d) read as follows:
[3] A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client,
knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice
based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,
sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates
paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the
administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the
foregoing factors does not violate paragraph (d).74
Though the ABA retained this language in part, it was not to support Model
Rule 8.4(d) but to support Model Rule 8.4(g).75 The ABA has yet to add a
supporting comment for paragraph (d).76
First, eight states have either not adopted Model Rule 8.4(d) or have
adopted language similar to the standard language used by the ABA.77 For
74

MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmts. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
76
See id.
77
The states that have not adopted Model Rule 8.4(d), i.e., the states in which
professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice, include Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Hampshire,
75
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example, Texas’s Rule states, “A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct
constituting obstruction of justice.”78 Other states, such as Wisconsin,79 fail
to reference misconduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Second, six states have expanded on the general language of Model Rule
8.4(d) by including references to discriminatory conduct within the rule
itself.80 Of these states, Washington has taken the most unique approach to
its adoption of Model Rule 8.4 in that it has two separate paragraphs that
reference conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.81
Moreover, twenty-five states have not retained, adopted, or drafted a
supporting comment.82 Of these states, several are worth mentioning. First,
Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See ALASKA RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; GA. RULES &
REGS. STATE BAR r. 8.4 (2015); HAW. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; KY. SUP. CT. R.
3.130(8.4); N.H. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r.
8.04 (2018); VA. SUP. CT. RULE pt. 6, sec. II, r. 8.4; WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:8.4.
78
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.04 (2018). Also, Texas does not have a
supporting comment. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.04 cmts. (2018).
79
Wisconsin is exceptional in that its misconduct rule is one of the shortest, and most of
its language is preserved in the form of a comment. See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:8.4. Wisconsin’s
entire rule reads as follows:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; (b) commit a
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.
Id.
80
For example, Florida, Nebraska, Rhode Island, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Washington include an explanation of conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice, which includes discriminatory treatment. See RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR ch. 4 r.
4-8.4 (2021); NEB. CT. R. OF PRO. CONDUCT § 3-508.4; R.I. SUP. CT. art. V, r. 8.4; N.D. RULES
OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16–18-App., r. 8.4 (2020); WASH. RULES OF
PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4.
81
See WASH. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4. Paragraph (d) states that “[i]t is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.” Id. at r. 8.4(d). Similarly, paragraph (h) states that “[i]t is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice . . . that a reasonable person would interpret as manifesting prejudice or bias.” Id. at r.
8.4(h).
82
The states that do not have a supporting comment for Model Rule 8.4(d) include
Alabama, Alaska, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
See ALA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; ALASKA RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; CAL. RULES
OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; GA. RULES & REGS. STATE BAR r. 8.4 (2015); HAW. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 8.4; IND. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; KAN. S. Ct. R. 226(8.4); KY. SUP. CT. R.
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Louisiana, in general, does not provide supporting comments for its rules of
professional conduct,83 which has caught the attention of some.84 Second,
New Jersey’s amendment comment to paragraph (g) seems to exist for the
sole purpose of explaining why it has not drafted one for that rule or others.85
The comment reasons that “[t]he Court believes the administration of justice
would be better served . . . by the adoption of this general rule[, New Jersey
Rule 8.4(g),] than by a case by case development of the scope of the
professional obligation.”86 Third, though Vermont Rule 8.4(d) does not have
a supporting comment, Vermont Rule 8.4 does provide, at length,
explanations to amendments that have impacted Vermont Rule 8.4(d).87
3.130(8.4); LA. STATE BAR ASS’N art. XVI § 8.4 (2018); MASS. SUP. CT. R. 3.07, RPC r. 8.4;
MICH. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; MINN. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; MISS. RULES OF
PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-8.4; MONT. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 (2020);
N.H. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; N.J. CT. R. pt. I, app. 3, RPC 8.4; OHIO RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 8.4; OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A, 8.4 (2021); OR. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r.
8.4 (2015); PA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r.
8.04 (2018); VT. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; VA. SUP. CT. RULE pt. 6, sec. II, r. 8.4; WIS.
SUP. CT. R. 20:8.4.
83
See LA. STATE BAR ASS’N art. XVI (2018). Montana is similarly situated. See MONT.
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (2020).
84
See N. Gregory Smith, Missed Opportunities: Louisiana’s Version of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, 61 LA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000).
85
See N.J. CT. R. pt. I app. 3, RPC 8.4 cmt.
86
Id. The “general rule” or “professional obligation” is in reference to making
“discriminatory conduct unethical when engaged in by lawyers in their professional
capacity” and refraining from unethical misconduct in general. See id.
87
See VT. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 reporter’s notes to 2017 amendment. For
example, the accompanying Reporter’s Notes, amended on July 14, 2017, and effective as of
September 18, 2017, specifically state:
Rule 8.4(g) and new Comments . . . are amended to adopt, with minor
verbal changes, amendments to the American Bar Association’s Model
Rules of Professional Conduct approved by the ABA on August 8, 2016.
Former Comment [3] is deleted and replaced by new Comment [3]. . . .
Despite prior unsuccessful amendment efforts, the Model Rules had
not previously contained a specific provision prohibiting discrimination
and harassment. Former Comment [3], adopted in 1988, had stated that
discrimination and harassment could violate Rule 8.4(d) if they
constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. That
Comment, however, was only a guide to interpretation and was of narrow
scope. New Model Rule 8.4(g) was adopted to fill this void with a black
letter rule. Its purpose is to fulfill the ABA’s responsibility to “lead
antidiscrimination, anti-harassment, and diversity efforts not just in the
courtroom, but wherever it occurs in conduct by lawyers related to the
practice of law. The public expects no less of us.”
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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More specifically, Vermont Rule 8.4 explains paragraph (d)’s interaction with
Vermont Rule 8.4(g).88 Lastly, Wisconsin expended a significant amount of
effort distinguishing its comments from those of the ABA—considering that
it chose not to adopt Model Rule 8.4(d). As a result, Model Rule 8.4(d) is only
referenced in Wisconsin’s comments to denote the absence of paragraph (d)
in its “Misconduct” rule and comments.89
On the other hand, of the states that have retained, adopted, or drafted a
supporting comment, only six of those states have included particularized
language that differs from the prior ABA supporting comment.90 In other
words, these states adopted the language provided by the ABA to the extent
the states agreed with the ABA’s interpretation of Model Rule 8.4(d). For
example, Arkansas’s supporting comment states that the proscribed conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice “extends to any
characteristic or status that is not relevant to the proof of any legal or factual
issue in dispute.”91
New York, however, took a more practical approach to develop language
that addressed misconduct traditionally associated with the administration
of justice.92 For instance, its supporting comment indicates that conduct
which is prejudicial to the administration of justice generally “results in
substantial harm to the justice system,” which may include “advising a client
to testify falsely, paying a witness to be unavailable, altering documents,
repeatedly disrupting a proceeding, or failing to cooperate in an attorney
disciplinary investigation or proceeding.”93 In New York, as a general
standard, prejudicial conduct “must be seriously inconsistent with a lawyer’s
responsibility as an officer of the court.”94
Other states have included more specific examples. For instance, North
Carolina does not require a showing of actual prejudice to the administration
of justice, only that the conduct have a “reasonable likelihood of prejudicing
88

Id.
See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:8.4 cmts.
90
The states that added different language include Arkansas, Florida, Maryland, North
Carolina, New York, and Utah. See Ark. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; RULES REGULATING
THE FLA. BAR ch. 4 r. 4-8.4 (2021); MD. R. 19-308.4 (2021); 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 (2017);
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 1200 r. 8.4 (2021); UTAH RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r.
8.4.
91
ARK. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3. Arkansas is one of the states that did not
adopt Model Rule 8.4(g); however, it retained references to discriminatory conduct in its
comment in support of its adoption of Model Rule 8.4(d). See id. Florida is similarly situated.
See RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR ch. 4 r. 4-8.4 cmt. para. 5 (2021).
92
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 1200 r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2021).
93
Id.
94
Id.
89
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the administration of justice.”95 Accordingly, North Carolina’s comments
cite various cases that illustrate the Rule’s broad application.96 Similarly, Utah
includes a sub-paragraph in its supporting comment that generally states
that, “The Standards of Professionalism and Civility . . . are intended to
improve the administration of justice.”97 Further, “An egregious violation or
a pattern of repeated violations of the Standards of Professionalism and
Civility may support a finding that the lawyer has violated paragraph (d).”98
While some states have not adopted Model Rule 8.4(d), others have
created their own version of the Rule. Moreover, at least half of the states have
failed to provide some form of a supporting comment. Despite the ABA
providing a framework for states to create their own Rule, there has yet to be
a general consensus favoring the shift of paragraph (d)’s supporting
comment to paragraph (g) after 2016.99 Thus, providing an opportunity for
paragraph (d) to embrace a supporting comment tailored to its personality.
B.

Case Studies

Though each state has taken its own approach in incorporating Model
Rule 8.4 into its rules of professional conduct, there are four major variations
that are worth mentioning. First, Wisconsin neither adopted paragraph (d),
i.e., conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, nor a
supporting comment.100 Second, Washington is the only state that provides
two different versions of paragraph (d) without supporting comments.101
Third, Louisiana is the only state that does not provide supporting comments
for any of its rules of professional conduct, though it did adopt the ABA’s
95

27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 cmt. 4 (2017).
27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 cmts. 4–5 (2017).
97
UTAH RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3a.
98
Id.
99
Approximately twenty-seven states have not adopted Model Rule 8.4(g) or have simply
retained a version of the Rule by preserving 8.4(d). See ALA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4;
ALASKA RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; ARIZ. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; ARK. RULES OF
PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; CONN. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; DEL. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r.
8.4; GA. RULES & REGS. STATE BAR r. 8.4 (2015); HAW. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; IDAHO
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 (2004); KAN. S. Ct. R. 226(8.4); KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.130 (8.4); LA.
STATE BAR ASS’N art. XVI § 8.4 (2018); MASS. SUP. CT. R. 3.07, RPC r. 8.4; MICH. RULES OF
PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; MISS. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; MONT. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT
(2020); N.H. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; N.M. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 16-804; OKLA.
STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A, § 8.4 (2021); PA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; S.C. APP. CT. R.
407, RPC 8.4; TENN. SUP. CT. R. 8.4; TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.04
(2018); UTAH RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; VA. SUP. CT. RULE pt. 6, sec. II, r. 8.4; W. VA.
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; WYO. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4.
100
See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:8.4.
101
See WASH. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4.
96
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version of paragraph (d).102 Lastly, North Carolina is one of few states that
have adopted supporting comments for paragraph (d) that differ from the
ABA’s supporting comment prior to 2016.103 North Carolina stands out from
the bunch because it has two supporting comments for its version of
paragraph (d).104 North Carolina’s supporting comments have helped lower
courts to determine whether an attorney’s conduct is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
1.

Wisconsin: Winston v. Boatwright—Prejudicial Conduct
Absent Paragraph (d)

Wisconsin’s current version of Model Rule 8.4 reads as follows:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or
attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another; (b) commit a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects.105
There is no indication that, at the time Winston v. Boatwright was decided,
Wisconsin had adopted language reflecting the ABA’s version of Model Rule
8.4(d),106 i.e., conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.107 Though
Wisconsin has not incorporated this language into its rule, it is worth
mentioning for this very reason. Like seven other states,108 Wisconsin has
neither adopted the current version of Model Rule 8.4(d) nor a supporting
102

See LA. STATE BAR ASS’N art. XVI § 8.4 (2018).
See 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 (2017).
104
See 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 cmts. 4–5 (2017).
105
WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:8.4.
106
Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d 618, 631 (7th Cir. 2011) (referencing other states’
versions of Model Rule 8.4 that prohibit conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice).
107
The language of Model Rule 8.4(d) is only mentioned in the comments. WIS. SUP. CT.
R. 20:8.4, cmts. Though paragraphs (a) and (b) comprise Wisconsin’s entire rule, its
comments include paragraphs (c) through (i), which seem to be a continuation of its rule.
See id. Wisconsin includes the ABA comments for Model Rule 8.4 and briefly references
actions that are prejudicial to the administration of justice. Id. However, the ABA comments
seem to have little bearing on Wisconsin’s rule. See id.
108
The seven states include Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Texas,
and Virginia. See ALASKA RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; GA. RULES & REGS. STATE BAR r. 8.4
(2015); HAW. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4; KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.130(8.4); N.H. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 8.4; TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.04 (2018); VA. SUP. CT. RULE
pt. 6, sec. II, r. 8.4.
103
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comment. Absent paragraph (d), Wisconsin still confronts lawyers engaging
in prejudicial conduct.109
Winston was not determined under the typical context of Model Rule
8.4(d); however, it is worth mentioning the court’s reference to other states’
versions of the Rule in light of the petitioner’s constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington.110 On October 5, 2001,
the petitioner was working at a local convenience store in Milwaukee when
Candida, a fifteen-year-old girl, invited the petitioner to “kick it” for the
day.111 According to Candida, while sitting in the back of the store, the
petitioner touched her inappropriately.112 The state initially charged the
petitioner with “one count of second-degree sexual assault of a child by
means of sexual intercourse,” but later amended the charge to two counts of
sexual assault in the second-degree.113 After finally going to trial,114 the jury
acquitted the petitioner on the first count but found him guilty of the
second.115 The petitioner requested a new trial asserting that he had received
ineffective assistance because defense counsel used his peremptory
challenges to strike male jurors, which the petitioner alleged resulted in
purposeful discrimination.116
In Winston, the Seventh Circuit highlighted Strickland’s development of
the two-prong approach to determine whether a defendant received
ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendants have to show that (1) “counsel
provided deficient assistance” and (2) “that there was prejudice as a result.”117
To establish the second prong, “a challenger must demonstrate a ‘reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.’”118 Federal courts defer to state courts
to determine the existence of a “reasonable probability.”119 According to the
109

See, e.g., Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 622 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
111
Id. at 622–23.
112
Id. at 623.
113
Id.
114
Id. (explaining that in Winston’s first trial, the jury did not reach a verdict, so the
court ordered a mistrial and appointed new counsel, which led Winston to allege that
appointed counsel had purposefully discriminated against him based on jury selection
because all the jurors were women).
115
Winston, 649 F.3d at 623.
116
Id. at 623–24.
117
Id. at 625 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011)).
118
Id. (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 787; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694
(1984)).
119
Id. (“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.”).
110
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court, the most difficult assessment was determining whether the petitioner
was able to show prejudice.120 Though an attorney may intuitively understand
the meaning of prejudice or even experience prejudice at some point,
understanding the legal boundaries in light of a state’s determination of
prejudice is another matter.
Pursuant to a line of cases governing claims of unsatisfactory
performance,121 the court concluded that the petitioner’s attorney deficiently
assisted him,122 despite Strickland’s definition. This is especially important
because, though a showing of prejudice is automatic when the selection of a
jury is in violation of the line of cases governing unsatisfactory performance,
it is not enough to overcome a state court’s error in its evaluation of a
defendant’s Strickland claim of ineffective assistance.123 For the petitioner to
have overcome the state court’s resolution, the state court’s decision had to
have been “so far out of bounds that it [was] objectively unreasonable.”124
Therefore, the question for the court was “whether the state court
transgressed the outer perimeter when it failed to see the link between the
analysis of prejudice in the structural error cases and the analysis of prejudice
in the Strickland line of cases.”125 Batson governed the structural error cases,
and Strickland governed the two-pronged assessment that required a
showing of prejudice.126 But because prejudice is not readily presumed under
a Strickland claim in the Sixth Amendment context, and because the state
120

Id. at 622.
“For more than 130 years, federal courts have held that discrimination in jury
selection offends the Equal Protection Clause.” Winston, 649 F.3d at 622. Moreover,
“[i]ntentional discrimination by any participant in the justice system undermines the rule of
law and, by so doing, harms the parties, the people called for jury duty, and the public as a
whole.” Id. (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding race-based use of
peremptory challenges unconstitutional); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (noting the
effects of discrimination during voir dire); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992)
(holding race-based use or considering racial stereotypes in the exercise of peremptory
challenges unconstitutional); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (applying Batson to
peremptory strikes meant to exclude men from the jury)). Winston’s unsatisfactory
performance claim was determined under Batson, Powers, McCollum, and J.E.B. Id. at 625–
27.
122
Winston, 649 F.3d. at 630. To review Winston’s claim, the court first had to determine
the “relevant clearly established law” at the time the state court made its decision. Id. at 625
(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660 (2004)). To do this, the Seventh Circuit
reviewed the “Strickland line of cases” governing “assertions of ineffective assistance of
counsel in violation of . . . Sixth Amendment rights, and the Batson line of cases” governing
claims of “unsatisfactory performance” of counsel. Id.
123
Id. at 625, 631–33.
124
Id. at 632.
125
Id. at 632–33.
126
Winston, 649 F.3d at 628, 632–33.
121
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court’s action was not objectively unreasonable under the then-existing
principles recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States, the
petitioner could not prevail in his petition for relief.127
But why does this matter? Though Winston was riddled with the
complexities of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the petitioner’s claim of
ineffective assistance seemed to hinge, almost exclusively, on a nine-letter
word: prejudice. In fact, Circuit Judge Wood prefaced the court’s opinion by
solidifying basic premises that most would acknowledge and accept.128 For
example, he stated that “society as a whole has an interest in the integrity of
the jury system,” but he later admitted that the most difficult question was
whether there could be a showing of prejudice when the jury system is what
prejudiced the petitioner.129 But why was a showing of prejudice so difficult
for the petitioner to establish? In other lines of cases, such as Batson and its
progeny, prejudice is presumed upon establishing unsatisfactory
performance.130 The plain answer, as provided by the Seventh Circuit, is that
even though the state court mixed apples and oranges, its resolution was not
objectively unreasonable.131 After all, how could a state court have predicted
“that the Supreme Court would apply a harmless-error standard even to
intentional Batson violations”?132
Notwithstanding Winston’s conclusions, could the underlying reason
have been that Wisconsin had not yet developed its own line of cases
assessing “reasonable probability” based in factually similar cases involving
prejudicial conduct or maybe even conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice? If the conduct were not prejudicial to the administration of justice,
could the court have granted the petitioner’s petition? When Winston was
decided jury selection would have certainly fallen within the scope of the
administration of justice.133 These considerations stem from Wisconsin’s
need for a rule that addresses conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice. Had there been a line of state court cases establishing reasonable
probability for the Seventh Circuit to determine whether prejudice was
present in jury selection, the Seventh Circuit could have assessed whether the
conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and could have
127

Id. at 633–34.
Id. at 622.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 633.
131
Id. at 632–33 (highlighting the state court’s error in determining petitioner’s
Strickland claim, despite the Supreme Court distinguishing structural error cases from
others).
132
Winston, 649 F.3d at 634.
133
See cases cited supra note 121.
128
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properly determined the petitioner’s Strickland claim. Though this is merely
speculative and does not comport with the law’s glacial pace of change, it does
provide an alternative theory that presses Wisconsin to adopt Model Rule
8.4(d) or at least consider a version of the Rule. Winston’s emaciated
reference to conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice urges
change.
Though mentioned in the context of Strickland and Batson claims,134 the
court stated, “Deliberately choosing to engage in conduct that the Supreme
Court has unequivocally banned is both professionally irresponsible and well
below the standard expected of competent counsel.”135 This, of course, was
meant to call out the petitioner’s attorney’s conduct, despite him framing his
actions as a “strategic advantage,” which, according to Batson, did not
contribute to protecting “society’s interest in an unbiased system of
justice.”136 Additionally, “intentionally violating the Constitution . . . is not
consistent with, or reasonable under, prevailing professional norms.”137
According to the court, state rules of professional conduct established
“professional norms.”138 For example, “Wisconsin forbids lawyers from
engaging in unlawful representation”139 and requires a lawyer’s conduct to
“conform to the requirements of the law.” 140 But Wisconsin fails to mention
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Thus, instead of
the Seventh Circuit citing to Wisconsin’s version of Model Rule 8.4(d), it
deferred to other states’ versions of the Rule and admitted that other
“[p]rofessional rules typically prohibit lawyers from engaging in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”141 Considering other states’
“well-established professional norms,” the court had no trouble concluding
that the petitioner’s attorney’s conduct “constituted deficient
performance.”142 Wisconsin should have determined its own professional
norms within its jurisdiction, not other states—especially professional norms
that related to prejudicial conduct.
134

Winston, 649 F.3d at 630.
Id. at 630.
136
Id. at 631.
137
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 688 (1984)).
138
See id.
139
Id. (citing WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20, Preamble). Wisconsin does not have a version of Model
Rule 8.4(d) to reference to determine professional norms. See generally WIS. SUP. CT. R.
20:8.4.
140
Winston, 649 F.3d at 631.
141
Id. at 631.
142
Id.
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As it stands, reasonable minds may have differed, “but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the [outcome] of the proceeding would have been
different.”143 However, had Wisconsin adopted its own version of Model Rule
8.4(d), the petitioner’s claim may not have gone before the Seventh Circuit
because the state court would have had its own rule to refer to at the
beginning of its proceedings. Instead, the Seventh Circuit deferred to other
states’ rules of professional conduct to determine professional norms in
Wisconsin.144 Though mentioned briefly in the petitioner’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim,145 the rules of professional conduct could have
helped to determine whether the petitioner’s attorney’s actions were
prejudicial. Unfortunately, the petitioner could only rely on a few short
phrases referring to other states’ rules,146 even though the prejudice claimed
by the petitioner differed from the prejudice in paragraph (d).
2.

Washington: In re Cottingham—Conduct that is Prejudicial
to the Administration of Justice Absent a Supporting
Comment

Washington is unique because its rule includes two separate paragraphs
addressing conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.147
Washington’s current version of Model Rule 8.4 includes the following:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (d) engage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice; . . . (h) in representing a client, engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice toward
judges, lawyers, or LLLTs, other parties, witnesses, jurors, or
court personnel or officers, that a reasonable person would
interpret as manifesting prejudice or bias . . . .148
Despite Washington adopting Model Rule 8.4(g) and language addressing
discrimination based on the listed categories,149 Washington not only
retained 8.4(d), but it also created a hybrid paragraph from paragraphs (d)
143

Id. at 625 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011)).
Id. at 631.
145
Id. at 625.
146
See id. at 631 (referring to Illinois, Minnesota, Washington, and even the ABA’s
version of Model Rule 8.4(d)).
147
See WASH. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4.
148
Id. (emphasis added).
149
See WASH. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (including categories such as “sex, race,
age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, honorably
discharged veteran or military status, or marital status”).
144
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and (g), as reflected by paragraph (h) above. Thus, Washington created a
second paragraph that delineated a narrower approach in defining conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice but also preserved a broad
approach to paragraph (d). At the time In re Cottingham was decided, though
it spanned across a “five-year boundary line dispute,”150 Washington’s
version of Model Rule 8.4 aligned with the changes adopted by the ABA after
2016 and accommodated both paragraphs (d) and (g) to promote ABA
objectives.151
Unlike most states, Washington’s version of Model Rule 8.4 includes
several well-developed paragraphs that address conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice but fails to include similarly developed
supporting comments.152 Despite Washington’s unique approach, like many
other states, it has yet to draft a supporting comment for its version of
paragraph (d).153
Prior to the proceedings in Cottingham that led to an eighteen-month
suspension, the attorney had no record of misconduct or discipline.154
However, the attorney’s thirty-year streak of practicing law absent
disciplinary issues ended in June 2009 when he filed a lawsuit against his
neighbors over the removal of eight laurel bushes.155 The trial judge found in
favor of the attorney’s claim of adverse possession; however, the trial judge
also condemned the land in favor of his neighbors.156 Thus, the judge ordered
the attorney’s neighbors to pay the fair market value of the land and damages
for the bushes, but the attorney did not accept.157 Instead, the attorney
pursued a number of legal challenges to change the court’s decision, which
included “court filings [that] were often, but not always, unintelligible [and]
rife with typographic and grammatical errors . . . .”158 Finally, in August 2015,
150

In re Cottingham, 423 P.3d 818, 820 (Wash. 2018).
As highlighted in the ABA’s report revising Model Rule 8.4, the Association’s
objectives were reformulated in 2008 to include “four major ‘Goals’ . . . .” Lynk, supra note
29, at 1. Two of which included the promotion of “full and equal participation in the
association, our profession, and the justice system by all persons” and the elimination of
“bias in the legal profession and the justice system.” Id.; see WASH. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r.
8.4.
152
WASH. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmts.
153
Washington’s supporting comment currently reads as follows: “Legitimate advocacy
respecting the factors set forth in paragraph (h) does not violate paragraphs (d) or (h).”
WASH. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3.
154
In re Cottingham, 423 P.3d at 820.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 820–21.
157
Id. at 821.
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Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
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the attorney accepted his neighbor’s payment for the land.159
Those laurel bushes were worth more than anyone could have anticipated.
The attorney’s “pursuit involved two lawsuits, four judicial appeals, two
administrative appeals, [over 700 filings], . . . and nearly $60,000 in sanctions
for [pleadings and motions] violations.”160 Notwithstanding the surge of
sanctions at each stage of the litigation, the court pointed out that the
attorney’s “initial lawsuit was not frivolous.”161 But because the attorney “had
ample warning that his arguments were unavailing and his continued pursuit
was frivolous,” his suspension was warranted.162 The Office of Disciplinary
Counsel (ODC) “formally charged [the attorney] with five counts of violating
the Rules of Professional Conduct.”163 The last count included that “[b]y
pursuing litigation and/or appeals before the trial court, the court of appeals,
and/or the . . . County hearing examiner with intent to harass and/or annoy
[his neighbors], [the attorney] violated RPC . . . 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice).”164 The attorney denied all charges.165
Essentially, the attorney “interfer[ed] with the administration of justice by
consuming substantial judicial time and resources without justification.”166
The court further provided that conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice “applies to ‘violations of practice norms and
physical interference with the administration of justice,’”167 which “is
generally . . . carried out by an attorney in an official or advocatory role.”168
As a result, the consumption of judicial resources violates practice norms and
thus paragraph (d).169 Although the attorney’s initial pleadings were not
frivolous and his conduct conformed with practice norms when filing suit,
the repetitive nature of each new pleading and motion amounted to an
“intent to harass his neighbors,” especially because his pleadings were “made
in his role as an advocate for himself and his wife.”170
Cottingham seemed to further solidify Washington’s consistent approach
to addressing violations related to conduct that is prejudicial to the
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id. at 822.
In re Cottingham, 423 P.3d at 820, 822.
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 823.
Id.
In re Cottingham, 423 P.3d at 823.
Id. at 825 (quoting In re Curran, 801 P.2d 962, 970 (Wash. 1990)).
Id. (citing In re Conteh, 284 P.3d 724, 731 (Wash. 2012)).
Id.
Id. at 822, 825.
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administration of justice. Despite the progression of modern trends,
Washington seems to employ a fairly moderate textual approach when
interpreting its version of paragraph (d). In addressing misconduct under
Model Rule 8.4, the court affirmed Washington’s focus on the “purposes of
lawyer discipline” and “serious misconduct” directly related to a lawyer’s
“professional life,”171 not to conduct that did not directly relate to the practice
of law.172 However, Washington does not embrace a strict focus on conduct
that directly interferes with the administration of justice.173
For example, the court acknowledged that “[t]he modern trend focuses
lawyer discipline fairly tightly upon conduct which directly interferes with
the administration of justice or occasions doubt about a lawyer’s competence
or honesty.”174 Notwithstanding the modern trend, as advanced by the ABA,
Washington did “not fully embrace” it.175 However, Washington did
“embrace the modern trend by putting more emphasis on disciplining
lawyers for violation[s] of practice norms.”176 As seen in Cottingham’s review
of the attorney’s disciplinary proceedings, violating practice norms amounts
to conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.177 Both in 1990
and as recently as 2018, violating practice norms amounted to conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice, which made it difficult for the
court to determine whether an attorney’s “acts merit[ed] discipline and if so,
what sort of discipline,”178 when based on practice norms.
Despite the difficulties that may come with using “practice norms” to
determine whether conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice,
there are numerous examples of violations of practice norms that clearly fall
within the proscribed conduct of Model Rule 8.4(d), which require little to
no interpretation.179 Further, proscribed conduct as measured or determined
by practice norms seems to be confined to only two specific contexts: (1)
171

In re Curran, 801 P.2d 962, 966 (Wash. 1990).
See id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id. (emphasis added).
176
Id.
177
See In re Cottingham, 423 P.3d 818, 824–25 (Wash. 2018).
178
In re Curran, 801 P.2d at 966.
179
See, e.g., In re Johnson, 790 P.2d 1227 (Wash. 1990) (converting trust fund money to
personal use); In re Lynch, 789 P.2d 752, 754 (Wash. 1990) (taking photos of undercover
police and showing them to a friend with a cocaine problem); In re Krogh, 536 P.2d 578, 579
(Wash. 1975) (conspiring to violate civil rights by breaking into a psychiatrist’s office to steal
documents); In re Conteh, 284 P.3d 724, 728 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (holding that the
attorney had falsely and incorrectly made statements that influenced the tribunal’s decision
and thus were “prejudicial to the administration of justice”).
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“conduct of an attorney in his official or advocatory role” or (2) “conduct
which might physically interfere with enforcing the law.”180 Thus, when
determining whether conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice,
Washington follows a fairly textual understanding of the administration of
justice, even with the supplementary considerations of practice norms
serving as a backdrop.
If practice norms are part of determining whether conduct was associated
with an attorney’s professional life or whether it physically interfered with
the justice system, then it stands to reason that Washington would
differentiate between conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice and conduct that is prejudicial to persons. Otherwise, it would have
been irrelevant for Washington to have recognized a general trend of
decisions identifying conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of
justice as seen in Curran181 and others. By simply distilling the text to anchor
its understanding of Model Rule 8.4(d), Washington’s focus seems to be on
an attorney’s disposition or physical interference in the administration of the
law, not on persons. Providing for an “expansive construction of the rule
against conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice [is] unnecessary,
even if the aims of lawyer discipline are viewed rather expansively.”182
Therefore, imposing sanctions under the Rule was never “meant to protect
the bar from damage done to the reputation of its members not connected
with either physical interference with law enforcement or violation of
practice norms.”183 Though Washington provides these distinctions in its
case law, it has yet to include them in a supporting comment for paragraph
(d). Only time will tell if Washington’s trend of rule development will spill
over into its supporting comments.
3.

Louisiana: In re McCool—Conduct that is Prejudicial to the
Administration of Justice Absent Supporting Comments

Louisiana’s current version of Model Rule 8.4(d) reads as follows: “It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . (d) Engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”184 Louisiana is a unique state
180

In re Curran, 801 P.2d at 970.
“Decisions in this jurisdiction show that conduct deemed prejudicial to the
administration of justice has generally been conduct of an attorney in his official or
advocatory role or conduct which might physically interfere with enforcing the law.” Id. The
court recognized, “Professor Hazard, a leading authority on legal ethics, [who] stated that the
rule against conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice should be construed to
include only clear violations of accepted practice norms.” Id.
182
Id.
183
Id. (emphasis added).
184
LA. STATE BAR ASS’N art. XVI § 8.4 (2018).
181
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because none of its black letter rules of professional conduct have supporting
comments.185 Despite Louisiana’s missed opportunities, it has taken
advantage of not having supporting comments because “problems of
vagueness and overbreadth”186 have been implicitly addressed in its case
law.187 At the time McCool was decided, Louisiana’s version of paragraph (d)
had not changed since its initial adoption in December 1986.188
In determining sanctions, Louisiana is mindful that “disciplinary
proceedings are not primarily to punish the lawyer, but rather are designed
to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the
integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct.”189 Therefore, “[t]he
discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the
seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.”190 Though the McCool court followed a set
process when determining sanctions by weighing several factors in a two-step
assessment, the court did not formulate a clear process to determine whether
an attorney’s conduct violates the state’s rules of professional conduct. In the
court’s defense, attorneys will know they have crossed the line when their
conduct is egregious enough;191 however, it is difficult to know precisely when
that line has been crossed. For example, in McCool, Justice Crichton wrote
separately to highlight respondent’s “disregard”:
[R]espondent’s most astounding and egregious action is her
complete and utter lack of remorse, and defiance in the face
of her impending sanction. At oral argument of this matter,
respondent admitted she did “not have any remorse for [her]
conduct” and that she would “continue to speak out and
advocate for change.” It is unfortunate that respondent does
not seem to understand that being a zealous advocate does
not equate to such repugnant disrespect for the system we
are charged to honor and serve.192
185

See LA. STATE BAR ASS’N art. XVI (2018); Smith, supra note 84, at 16–17.
Smith, supra note 84, at 16–17, 86–87.
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See, e.g., In re McCool, 2015-0284 (La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 3d 1058; In re O’Dwyer, 20161848 (La. 3/15/17); 221 So. 3d 1 (per curiam); In re Evans, 2019-01461 (La. 12/10/19); 284 So.
3d 634 (per curiam); In re Gill, 2015-1373 (La. 10/23/15); 181 So. 3d 669 (per curiam).
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See LA. STATE BAR ASS’N art. XVI § 8.4 (1986).
189
In re McCool, 2015-0284, pp. 31–32 (La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 3d 1058, 1078 (citing La.
State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173, 1177–78 (La. 1987)).
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Id. at 32, 172 So. 3d at 1078 (citing La. State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520,
524 (La. 1984)).
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E.g., id. at 41, 172 So. 3d at 1089–90 (Crichton, J., concurring).
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Hence, it was not that the respondent’s conduct prejudiced the
administration of justice and violated other rules of professional conduct, but
that she neither noticed nor acknowledged that her conduct warranted such
disregard by the court. The respondent believed her conduct was “perfectly
okay.”193
In a “rather complex” series of events, the respondent’s disciplinary
proceedings sprouted from her friend Raven’s divorce in 2006.194 Raven
accused her former husband of sexually abusing their two daughters.195 These
accusations were part of proceedings pending resolution before Judge
Deborah Gambrell in Mississippi.196 Thus, in an effort to further her friend’s
intentions, the respondent filed a petition before Judge Dawn Amacker in
Louisiana to begin intrafamily adoption proceedings on behalf of Raven’s
new husband.197 However, displeased with the rulings made by both judges,
the respondent “drafted an online petition entitled ‘Justice for [H] and [Z]’
which she and Raven posted on the internet at change.org, along with a photo
of the two girls.”198
To further disseminate the petition, the respondent posted the “petition
on her blog site and in online articles she authored,” which included the
judges’ offices’ contact information and encouraged readers to express how
they felt about the cases by contacting the judges.199 One of the signers of the
petition contacted Judge Gambrell’s office and said that “she would ‘be
paying attention’ to Raven’s case ‘due to the fact that Judge Gambrell refused
to hear evidence of abuse in the case of little girls who [were] likely being
molested by their father.’”200 Similarly, Raven or her mother faxed a copy of
the petition to Judge Amacker’s office, which was returned with instructions
that the attorney caution Raven against these communications.201
Nevertheless, the respondent persisted and even provided a link to audio
recordings of Raven and the two girls discussing the alleged abuse.202 Later,
the respondent went on to use her “personal Twitter account to promote the
online petition and to . . . draw attention to the audio recordings.”203 On one
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
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Id. at 21, 172 So. 3d at 1072.
Id. at 1, 172 So. 3d at 1060.
In re McCool, 2015-0284, p. 1 (La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 3d 1058, 1060.
Id.
Id. at 2, 172 So. 3d at 1060–61.
Id. at 2, 172 So. 3d at 1061.
Id. at 3, 172 So. 3d at 1061.
Id. at 4, 172 So. 3d at 1062.
In re McCool, 2015-0284, pp. 4–5 (La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 3d 1058, 1062.
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Id. at 6, 172 So. 3d at 1063.
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particular day, she tweeted thirty times about it.204
After both Judge Amacker and Judge Gambrell recused themselves,205 the
ODC filed one count against the respondent, alleging her conduct violated
Louisiana Rule 8.4(d), among others.206 Thus, in an effort to properly
distinguish the allegations brought against the respondent, the court created
three broad categories, one of which included a discussion on conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice.207 The court used specific
instances of the respondent’s conduct to determine whether she violated the
first two categories—improper ex parte communications and dissemination
of false and misleading information.208 But when assessing the third
category—conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice—the court
pointed out that the attorney’s “overall conduct” constituted a violation.209
Nevertheless, at her formal hearing, the respondent “suggested her conduct
was justified by what the judges had done in the underlying cases and in the
interest of protecting the minor children.”210 Also, during her testimony,
when asked, “What is your recourse then under the law?”—after she
exhausted what the law allowed—she answered, “Weep for the children.”211
After concluding the respondent violated Louisiana Rule 8.4(d), the court
implied three major findings from the ODC hearing committee. First, using
extraneous communications, information, or publications to influence a
judge’s ruling violates paragraph (d).212 Second, intimidating the
“independence and integrity” of the court violates paragraph (d).213 Third,
causing a judge to be concerned for his or her personal safety violates
paragraph (d).214 Notwithstanding the committee’s conclusions, the
respondent claimed she intended her statements to “encourage the public, to
extoll their elected judges to do justice, listen to the evidence, apply the law,
204
Id. One of the tweets included the following: “Judges are supposed to know s[ ]
about—the law—aren’t they. And like evidence and s[ ]? Due process? [link to online
petition].” Id.
205
Id. at 8–9, 172 So. 3d at 1065.
206
Id. at 9–10, 172 So. 3d at 1065.
207
In re McCool, 2015-0284, p. 15 (La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 3d 1058, 1068–69.
208
See id. at 16–26, 172 So. 3d at 1069–75.
209
Id. at 26, 31, 172 So. 3d at 1075, 1078. McCool’s “overall conduct” included using the
“internet and social media . . . to influence the judges and to expedite . . . her goals in the
case . . . .” Id. at 26, 172 So. 3d at 1075.
210
Id. at 11, 172 So. 3d at 1066.
211
Id.
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See id. at 26–27, 172 So. 3d at 1075.
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See In re McCool, 2015-0284, pp. 26–27 (La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 3d 1058, 1075.
214
See id. at 27, 172 So. 3d at 1075.
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and protect children.”215 Though the court noted several United States
Supreme Court cases within the context of the First Amendment when
addressing the respondent’s claims,216 the principles that followed from the
court’s observations seemed to highlight Model Rule 8.4(d)’s purpose and
even provided a glimpse into an attorney’s desire for justice and high ethical
standards.
The United States Constitution was not meant to shield attorneys from
engaging in unethical conduct.217 Therefore, an attorney’s extraneous
communications may be “extremely circumscribed”218 to preserve the
integrity of the profession and independence of judicial proceedings. If the
United States Constitution does not shield attorneys and is meant to preserve
the integrity of the profession, then attorneys’ obligations as officers of the
court require them to deny their own desires in exchange for justice and the
highest standards of legal ethics. For example, in In re Sawyer, Justice Stewart
exhorted, “Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what
in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected . . . .”219 Instead of
identifying advocates as human beings or lawyers, they are “intimate and
trusted and essential part[s] of the machinery of justice, . . . ‘officer[s] of the
court’ in the most compelling sense.”220 This goes to show that attorneys are
limited—even in their zealous desire to see justice come to fruition. The
justice system demands an attorney to renounce all selfish ambition at the
threshold of advocacy. Consequently, both to appease fairness and to honor
the authority that comes with being an officer of the court, attorneys ought
to refrain from conduct perceived to be threatening or intimidating. Thus, it
stands to reason that the court in McCool held the respondent “to a higher
standard than a non-lawyer member of the public”221 and found the
respondent’s conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
But is it enough to say that the attorney in McCool should have known to
draw the line where the court suggested it was? Justice Crichton summarized
by quoting Judge Benjamin Cardozo: “Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions.”222 Being that those conditions are often without
215
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See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991)).
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Id. at 668 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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count, it is difficult, even now, for the court to determine what those
conditions are, or when they are met. Consequently, when do extraneous
communications become prejudicial, or when is the independence or
integrity of the court violated, let alone the safety of the judiciary? Is it when
the administrators of justice are coerced into a position of bias as a result of
experiencing prejudice? Or is it when the administrators of justice anticipate
the likelihood of an advocate becoming prejudicial? The former is an innate
human response, while the latter is a forecasting of the human condition.
They are simply two sides of the same coin. On one side, bias is inevitable as
a matter of prejudice, and on the other, prejudice is presumed to avoid bias.
4.

North Carolina: North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont—
Conduct that is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice
with Supporting Comments

North Carolina’s current version of Model Rule 8.4(d) reads as follows: “It
is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . (d) engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”223 Even though North Carolina
Rule 8.4 only has one paragraph that references “conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice,” its paragraph has two supporting
comments.224 Comment 4 to North Carolina Rule 8.4 reads as follows:
A showing of actual prejudice to the administration of
justice is not required to establish a violation of paragraph
(d). Rather, it must only be shown that the act had a
reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the administration of
justice. . . . Conduct warranting the imposition of
professional discipline under paragraph (d) is characterized
by the element of intent or some other aggravating
circumstance. The phrase “conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice” in paragraph (d) should be read
broadly to proscribe a wide variety of conduct, including
conduct that occurs outside the scope of judicial
proceedings.225
Comment 5 reads as follows:
Threats, bullying, harassment, and other conduct serving no
substantial purpose other than to intimidate, humiliate, or
embarrass anyone associated with the judicial
223
224
225

27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 (2017).
See 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 cmts. 4–5 (2017).
27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 cmt. 4 (2017).
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process . . . violate the prohibition on conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice. . . . Comments “by one lawyer
tending to disparage the personality or performance of
another . . . tend to reduce public trust and confidence in our
courts and, in more extreme cases, directly interfere with the
truth-finding function by distracting judges and juries from
the serious business at hand.”226
These comments are noteworthy. Of the states that have included supporting
comments for their versions of paragraph (d), only a few states have provided
their own explanations or illustrations as alternatives to the language drafted
by the ABA.227 North Carolina is one of them. North Carolina’s comments
have consistently offered guidance in determining whether an attorney’s
conduct has risen to the level proscribed by paragraph (d),228 as comments
are meant to do.229 North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont was a foundational
case in developing North Carolina’s supporting comments to paragraph (d).
North Carolina has continued to build off of DuMont to support paragraph
(d)’s application.230
As the keystone case of Comment 4, DuMont serves as a general example
of when conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice. The DuMont
court held that procuring false testimony had a reasonable likelihood of
prejudicing the administration of justice and warranted suspension.231 Thus,
when establishing a violation of paragraph (d), a showing of actual prejudice
is not required.232 Instead, it is sufficient to show that an attorney’s conduct
226

27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 cmt. 5 (2017).
For example, both Arkansas and Florida drafted a similar supporting comment, but
one that differs from the language provided by the ABA prior to the 2016 shift. See ARK.
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3; RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR ch. 4 r. 4-8.4 cmt.
para. 5 (2021). Also, New York’s supporting comment states: “The prohibition on conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice is generally invoked to punish conduct, whether
or not it violates another ethics rule, that results in substantial harm to the justice system
comparable to those caused by the obstruction of justice . . . .” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 22 § 1200 r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2021). It ends by summarizing: “The conduct must be seriously
inconsistent with a lawyer’s responsibility as an officer of the court.” Id.
228
See discussion infra Section III.B.4.
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*5–6 (N.C. Sept. 28, 2017).
231
N.C. State Bar v. DuMont, 277 S.E.2d 827, 835–36 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981), modified, 286
S.E.2d 89 (N.C. 1982).
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27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 cmt. 4 (2017).
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had a “reasonable likelihood” of prejudicing the administration of justice.233
North Carolina State Bar v. Key234 further defined paragraph (d)’s scope. For
example, neglecting client matters was a violation of paragraph (d), because
paragraph (d) could be construed to include conduct “outside the scope of
judicial proceedings.”235 Consequently, a “[w]illful refusal to appear” on
behalf of a client “has a ‘reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the
administration of justice.’”236
North Carolina courts continue to assess an attorney’s conduct based on
a broad reading of paragraph (d) and based on the reasonable likelihood of
conduct prejudicing the administration of justice, as prescribed by Comment
4.237 For example, in North Carolina State Bar v. Sutton, the court emphasized
that “‘[t]he Comment accompanying each Rule [of Professional Conduct]
explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule.’ As such, the
official commentary . . . ‘provide[s] guidance for practicing in compliance
with the Rules.’”238 It was proper for the court to have utilized the
commentary to paragraph (d) in construing paragraph (d)’s meaning.239 In
fact, well before 2016, the language in Comment 4 had already been adopted
as a standard in assessing attorney conduct under paragraph (d).240
Consequently, the court reasonably concluded that Sutton’s repeated
interjections, sarcastic remarks, coached responses, answered questions, and
misrepresented assertions of forgery violated paragraph (d), because “such
disruptive and improper tactics ‘had a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing
the administration of justice.’”241
In 2017, the Supreme Court of North Carolina decided to amend
Comment 4 to include “[c]onduct warranting the imposition of professional
discipline under paragraph (d) is characterized by the element of intent or
some other aggravating circumstance.”242 Though the amendment was meant
to further develop Comment 4, Comment 5 was supplemented because
233

Id. (emphasis added).
N.C. State Bar v. Key, 658 S.E.2d 493 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
235
Id. at 501 (quoting 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 cmt. 4 (2005)).
236
Id. (quoting 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 cmt. 4 (2005)); see 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4
cmt. 4 (2017).
237
See 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 cmt. 4 (2017).
238
N.C. State Bar v. Sutton, 791 S.E.2d 881, 897 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted)
(quoting 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.0.2(a), (h) (2003)).
239
Id.
240
Id. (citing Key, 658 S.E.2d at 501).
241
Id. at 897, 899 (emphasis added) (quoting 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 cmt. 4 (2015)).
242
Amends. to the Rules of Pro. Conduct of the N.C. State Bar, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 789, at
*5–6 (N.C. Sept. 28, 2017).
234
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Comment 4’s “reasonable likelihood” standard would apply to Comment 5—
but as defined in the context of Comment 5. As such, the amendment seemed
misplaced because it better reflected Comment 5’s efforts in defining
paragraph (d). For instance, the amendment to Comment 4 characterizes
conduct in terms of intent or aggravating circumstances, while Comment 5
highlights examples, such as “[t]hreats, bullying, harassment, and other
conduct serving no substantial purpose other than to intimidate, humiliate,
or embarrass,” which “tend[s] to disparage the personality or performance of
another.”243 The amendment to Comment 4 seemed to be a precursor to
Comment 5 by listing examples of Comment 4’s broad language. North
Carolina should consider moving the amended language to the beginning of
Comment 5. To preserve Comment 4’s standard in determining whether
conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice under Comment 5,
Comment 5 should simply reference Comment 4’s standard.
In light of Comment 5 and other supporting comments,244 two cases were
decided a few months after the Supreme Court of North Carolina amended
Rule 8.4.245 First, in North Carolina State Bar v. Foster, the court held the
defendant engaged in conduct “serving no substantial purpose other than to”
disrespect the tribunal.246 As proscribed by Comment 5 and other supporting
comments, the “defendant made vulgar and profane statements toward and
in the presence of [the] Magistrate [Judge,]” which prejudiced the
administration of justice because disrespecting a judicial officer is reasonably
likely to encourage disrespect for the courts and legal profession.247 Apart
from Comment 5’s admonitions, the defendant’s behavior seriously
concerned the court,248 which further affirmed North Carolina’s decision to
243

27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 cmts. 4–5 (2017).
See, e.g., 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.4.4 cmt. 2 (2003); 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.3.5 cmt. 10
(2019).
245
See N.C. State Bar v. Foster, 808 S.E.2d 920 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017); N.C. State Bar v.
Livingston, 809 S.E.2d 183 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017).
246
Foster, 808 S.E.2d at 924 (emphasis omitted).
247
Id. at 924–25.
248
Despite the court reversing the defendant’s conviction on procedural grounds, it
reiterated its concerns from a prior decision:
244

We are, however, very troubled by defendant’s use of profanity in the
magistrate’s office while conducting court-related business despite
warnings by the magistrate about the inappropriate language. Such
disrespect, particularly by an attorney familiar with proper courtroom
practices, is wholly inappropriate. . . . [W]e find defendant’s attitude
offensive and incomprehensible.
Id. at 924 (quoting In re Foster, 744 S.E.2d 496, No. COA12-865, 2013 WL 2190072, at *19
(N.C. Ct. App. May 21, 2013) (unpublished table decision)).
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add new language to Comment 4.
Second, in North Carolina State Bar v. Livingston, the court held the
attorney violated North Carolina Rule 4.4 as determined under Comment
2.249 This is significant because it is similar to Comment 5.250 On one hand,
the attorney’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice
because he failed “to take corrective action” and exercise reasonable diligence
to amend his client’s pleadings.251 On the other hand, his conduct may have
also been prejudicial to the administration of justice under Comment 5,
which is similar to Rule 4.4.252 The attorney’s conduct violated Rule 4.4 when
he threatened to file a new, but frivolous lawsuit every month against
opposing counsel to force a settlement.253 Though the court did not explicitly
state he prejudiced the administration of justice in light of Rule 4.4, it did use
Comment 2 of Rule 4.4 to conclude that the attorney violated paragraph (a)
by making threats and claims unfounded in law or fact.254 Due to the
attorney’s misconduct, “his clients were deprived of any opportunity to
pursue whatever potentially legitimate claims they had against the proper
parties,”255 thus constituting conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
North Carolina’s supporting comments set out a clear standard and a
robust set of illustrations to apply paragraph (d).256 The ABA and other states
can learn a lot from North Carolina’s approach.
C.

The Psychology Underlying Misconduct

Attorneys spend most of their time making decisions.257 Therefore, it is no
mystery that attorneys’ conduct would be measured in terms of their
decisions, and thus, their behavior. Pressing situations and decision-making
mechanisms tend to shape the legal profession; consequently, it stands to
reason that these concepts could help explain an attorney’s conduct in the
practice of law. Like the practice of law, the concepts that help characterize
249

Livingston, 809 S.E.2d at 197–98.
Compare 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.4.4 cmt. 2 (2003) (highlighting conduct that serves
no substantial purpose in violation of its rule), with 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 cmt. 5 (2017)
(using similar language to proscribe conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
251
Livingston, 809 S.E.2d at 192.
252
Compare 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 cmt. 5 (2017), with 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.4.4
(2017).
253
Livingston, 809 S.E.2d at 197–98.
254
Id.
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Id. at 192.
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See 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2.8.4 cmts. 4–5 (2017).
257
Ask any attorney. ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 68, at 85.
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human behavior are not an exact science.258 Because the practice of law is not
an exact science, valuing the implications of human behavior to understand
misconduct should be intuitive for those in the legal profession. After all,
conduct is defined in terms of one’s behavior.259
Sorting through and recognizing the nuances of human behavior is not a
novel concept. This Comment suggests that judges, attorneys, and court
personnel are better equipped to determine whether conduct is prejudicial to
the administration when paragraph (d)’s supporting comment incorporates
theories of psychology.
1.

Psychology: The Science of How People Feel, Think, and
Behave260

Why should practicing attorneys occupy themselves with the feelings,
thoughts, and behaviors of others? The simple answer is that attorneys are
constantly communicating with people.261 In fact, it would be quite difficult
to accomplish anything in the practice of law without interacting with others.
And yes, that even includes submitting electronic documents to the court,
because after all, the court is merely a composite of individual persons.
Therefore, because interacting with others is inevitable, whether personally
or virtually, attorneys have the potential to be more effective officers of the
court by acknowledging and effectuating the depth of psychology.262 Not only
would the application of psychology offer insight into other people’s
behaviors, but attorneys may even stand to appreciate the insights gained by
reflecting on their own conduct.
Luckily, the conversation addressing the impact that science can have on
the administration of justice is already here and has been for some time.263
While evaluating patents for a sodium chloride solution, Judge Learned
Hand noted, “I cannot stop without calling attention to the extraordinary
condition of the law which makes it possible for a man without any
258

See generally HINTS ON ADVOCACY 17th ed., supra note 55, at 309–10.
In general, “conduct” is “[p]ersonal behavior, whether by action or inaction, verbal or
nonverbal; the manner in which a person behaves; collectively, a person’s deeds.” Conduct,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Further, “unprofessional conduct” is “[b]ehavior
that is immoral, unethical, or dishonorable, esp[ecially] when judged by the standards of the
actor’s profession.” Unprofessional Conduct, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
260
See ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 68, at 1.
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
See generally Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1911) (drawing attention to the role that science can play in the practice of law), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 196 F. 496, 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1912) (“Judge Hand’s opinion is most
exhaustive.”).
259
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knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry to pass upon such questions
as these.”264 Judge Hand appeared to imply that the practice of law is always
in a position to gain “from the whole range of human knowledge,”265 which
can include the science behind human behavior. Judge Hand also noted,
“How long [shall we] continue to blunder along without the aid of unpartisan
and authoritative scientific assistance in the administration of justice, no one
knows; but all fair persons not conventionalized by provincial legal habits of
mind ought, I should think, unite to effect some such advance.”266 Thus, the
legal profession thrives when legally significant principles are incorporated
into the practice of law.
Since Judge Hand’s benediction, the law has, in some respects, honored
the science behind certain practice areas. For example, the science underlying
patents has been honored by requiring technical qualifications to practice
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO);267 however,
little honor has been rendered to the science behind human behavior in the
training and practice of law.268 Most are left to simply rely on intuition,269
even though the study of human behavior in the practice of law stands by
idly, not yet fully explored. To honor Judge Hand’s exhortation, the legal
profession should continue to employ science. Imagine if the legal profession
had a work-made-for-hire270 with the study of human behavior, where the
264

Id. at 97, 115.
Id. at 115.
266
Id.
267
“No individual will be registered to practice before the Office unless he or she has,”
among other requirements,
265

Established to the satisfaction of the OED Director that he or she: (i)
[p]ossesses good moral character and reputation; (ii) [p]ossesses the legal,
scientific, and technical qualifications necessary for him or her to render
applicants valuable service; and (iii) [i]s competent to advise and assist
patent applicants in the presentation and prosecution of their applications
before the Office.
37 C.F.R. § 11.7(a)(2)(i)–(iii) (2021) (emphasis added).
268
“Law school courses do not usually focus on the part of the job that involves
understanding human psychology.” ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 68, at 1.
269
See id. at 2.
270
A work-made-for-hire, as provided under the Copyright Act, allows “employers and
parties who commission the creation of copyrightable works [to] stand in as the sole author
for such works.” Sean M. O’Connor, Hired to Invent vs. Work Made for Hire: Resolving the
Inconsistency Among Rights of Corporate Personhood, Authorship, and Inventorship, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1227, 1233 (2012) (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (2011)). Its counterpart
under patent law is the hired-to-invent exception, which allows “title to the invention [to be]
equitably vest[ed] in the employer.” Id. at 1240 (citing United States v. Dubilier Condenser
Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188–89 (1933)).

140

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:1

study of human behavior framed the Model Rules’ definition of misconduct.
If the legal profession employed the study of human behavior, attorneys
would better understand when conduct becomes misconduct.
2.

Situationism

Situationism is traditionally framed as a juxtaposed term within
attribution theory; however, situationism is worth exploring individually.
Nevertheless, to better understand situationism and its role in explaining
human behavior, the competing approach is worth mentioning.
Attribution theory is defined in social psychology as the “processes
involved in judgments about the cause of behavior and inferences about those
people made on the basis of such judgments.”271 There are two attributional
approaches.272 The first approach is “the dispositionist approach, which
explains outcomes and behavior with reference to people’s dispositions (that
is, personalities, preferences, and the like).”273 The second is “the situationist
approach [or situationism], which bases attributions of causation and
responsibility on unseen (though often visible) influences within us and
around us.”274 Understanding the general scope of situationism, in light of
dispositionism, “is vitally important because law is centrally concerned with
making attributions.”275 For example, judges and attorneys constantly make
inferences about a person’s behavior and evaluate outcomes in terms of those
inferences. Whether people care to admit it, “humans are subject to
significant attributional biases.”276
Attributional biases may be more prevalent in the practice of law than the
use of objective reasoning. The practice of law, and the law itself, is often
framed in terms of objectivity; and the law frequently encourages attorneys
to act within the bounds of reasonable objectivity. “In spite of the prevalence
and strong appeal of those notions, however, we are actually moved
significantly more by our situations—unseen or underappreciated elements
in our environment and within our interiors—than we are by dispositionbased choice.”277 For instance, situationism would suggest that people fall
271

Igor Grossmann & Lee Ross, Attributions, in THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFESPAN
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 189, 189 (Marc H. Bornstein ed., 2018).
272
Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Attributions and Ideologies: Two Divergent Visions of
Human Behavior Behind Our Laws, Policies, and Theories, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND
LAW 298, 298 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012).
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274
Id.
275
Id.
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Id. at 299.
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into “bankruptcy because of lost jobs, divorce, or unforeseen medical costs,”
while dispositionism would suggest that people fall into bankruptcy because
of some proclivity of character.278 Thus, just as some would “encourage
policymakers to rely more heavily on situationist advisers and adopt
additional measures to strengthen situationism in broader society,”279 the
ABA may also consider formulating its supporting comments in terms of
situationism, as it is more telling of one’s behavior. Though inaccurate,
dispositionism “can be a simple, time-saving, affirming, psychic-costminimizing heuristic,”280 that serves as a means of explaining human
behavior in the practice of law.281
a.

Limitations

Situationism may act as a forecast of human behavior, but it is not without
its limitations. In light of dispositionism’s focus on internal proclivities, it is
worth noting a couple of situationism’s limitations.282 First, though
“[i]ndividuals realize that situational factors play a significant role in shaping
behavior,” they do so “to the extent that[] the situational factors are
cognitively striking.”283 Because people have “limited cognitive capacit[y],”284
people make sweeping judgments about other people’s decisions by only
concentrating on a person’s decision, as oppose to the situational elements
that led the person to make that decision.285 Our internal proclivities are
summoned by our cognitive inability to change our focus from one’s
disposition to situational influences. Thus, to evaluate others in terms of their
situations, people must be intentional about distinguishing between the two.
Another limitation on situationism is that humans are naturally “inclined
toward dispositionist attributions.”286 This is especially true in the practice of
law because objectivity is more desirable, and attorneys “desire to see
[them]selves in self-affirming ways.”287 In other words, people “like to believe
that [they] are independent, intelligent consumers of life’s many options—
the attitude-driven, reasoning choice makers of commercials and

278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
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287

Benforado & Hanson, supra note 272, at 299.
Id. at 300.
Id.
See discussion infra Section III.C.3.
See Benforado & Hanson, supra note 272, at 301.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 302.
Id. at 303.
Id.
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[movies].”288 People “see [them]selves as in control of [their] destinies,” not
as “victims of situation[s].”289 Justice may lead some attorneys to believe that
“[w]hen something bad happens,” someone must be blamed, and “when
something really bad happens,” someone “really” must be blamed.290 Thus,
people “defensively seek protection through [their] attributions.”291 This is
especially true when people use objective reasoning to prove that their
decisions are safe and just.292 When people frame others in terms of
dispositions as opposed to situations, objective reasoning suggests that
people can maintain control to avoid a negative result.293
b.

Lay psychology

Though these limitations significantly thwart people’s ability to see their
behavior as it truly occurs out in the wild, another more pressing factor
continues to infringe upon people’s ability to evaluate human behavior.
“[C]ontemporary psychology’s understanding of the dynamic relationship
between the person and the situation in determining behavior” inadvertently
finds itself competing with “the views of fairness and efficacy that underlie
the ‘lay psychology’ that pervades our society.”294 Should the developments
of behavioral social sciences outweigh the lay views of psychology? Though
pragmatism is often at the forefront of the practice of law, it is important to
consider “the relative power of influences that are considered in discussions
of . . . appropriate punishment for violations of the law”295 or in this case,
rules of professional conduct.
Laypeople have the tendency “to underestimate the impact of situational
pressures and constraints.”296 As such, “the legal system’s consideration of
mitigating factors or ‘excuses’ reflects lay conceptions of behavioral causation
and dualistic notions of ‘free will’ that are neither empirically nor logically

288

Benforado & Hanson, supra note 272, at 303.
Id.
290
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Id.
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See id. at 303–04.
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Id.
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Ross & Shestowsky, supra note 64, at 612.
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Id.
296
Id. A lay person’s tendency to make “unwarranted dispositional” attributions “is
exacerbated by naïve realism,” which is “the assumed veridicality and objectivity of one’s
own perceptions and judgments relative to those of one’s peers.” Id. This is especially
dangerous when determining whether an attorney has violated a rule of professional
conduct, because the attorney is viewed in terms of another’s disposition as opposed to the
influencing factors of the attorney’s particular situation.
289
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defensible.”297 This would be equivalent to a jury sitting as judge in a bench
trial. Laypersons would be tasked with determining both questions of law and
fact—making the practice of law, law school, and even apprenticeships
superfluous. Indeed, neither legal scholars nor those practicing would
propose such a shift in the legal profession. Therefore, why would judges and
attorneys compete or even impose their lay views of psychology on wellestablished theories of psychology? The simple answer is obliviousness.
Nevertheless, contemporary psychologists suggest and situationism
implicitly promotes that “[a] logically coherent account of behavioral
causation that incorporates the lessons of empirical research, . . . would at the
very least compel us to treat transgressors with more compassion than they
typically receive.”298
Social psychology exhorts legal professionals to recognize “laypeople’s
intuitions about how they or other ‘reasonable’ people would have acted in
the face of various situational factors and constraints” and how those
intuitions “are likely to be erroneous.”299 This, in part, helps to explain:
That [a] relative lack of insight in considering the power of
the situation is particularly likely in cases in which the
external influences at play are . . . subtler matters of peer
pressure or of situations inducing small initial transgressions
that in turn lead . . . to increasingly serious ones.300
If most people can be misled by these subtle changes in their surroundings to
engage in conduct that they believe they are incapable of engaging in,301 then
situation attributions are at least worth exploring in determining Model Rule
violations. More importantly, though laypeople may not fully understand
these conventions, such as the “power of situation” and “dispositionist bias,”
or change in a “wrongdoer’s” behavior, changing how the legal profession
defines the roles of judges and attorneys and other social structures is likely
to foster change in behavior.302
Despite laypeople’s perceptions of psychology, situational influences
continue to impact how attorneys approach the practice of law. The
implications of experiencing child abuse, spousal abuse, the death of a loved
one, or parental absenteeism in determining the causal link to “wrongful”

297
298
299
300
301
302

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 613.
Ross & Shestowsky, supra note 64, at 614.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 615.
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conduct303 are without end, and yet, the power of those situational influences
can hardly be denied or underestimated. Still, people cannot forget that
“many actors in similar situations (and many who faced even more
dysfunctional . . . environments) did act otherwise.”304 Nevertheless, the legal
system should consider the “incorrigibles” in light of their misfortune305 or
situational factors. Evaluating misconduct through situational factors is not
meant to enable “incorrigibles” to engage in misconduct, but to determine
whether their conduct was truly the result of behavioral ills.
3.

Heuristics: Judgment Shortcuts

The practice of law often compels attorneys to make judgments based on
objective reasoning and “full information,” but attorneys are not always
deliberate or systematic in making judgments, and instead, rely on
intuition.306 Attorneys often rely on intuition because it is cost-effective,
efficient, and effortless.307 “Cognitive heuristics are ways in which people
simplify or take shortcuts in making judgments.”308 However, these shortcuts
can lead to “systematic errors in judgment.”309 Two ways in which heuristics
can lead to skewed judgments include positive illusions and hindsight bias;
both are founded in the belief that people perceive themselves in self-serving
ways.310
Overconfidence is a positive illusion that most legal professionals have
experienced. Overconfidence may be a hard pill to swallow, but is one with
which most people are familiar. Sometimes attorneys are oblivious to the
existence of overconfidence.311 Placing outcomes in terms of self-serving
success keeps observers from seeing the uncertainty inherent in their
judgments.312 One example of this is when “negotiators are overconfident
about the persuasiveness of their positions.”313 Ironically, “the greater the
uncertainty [people] face, the more overconfident . . . predictions tend to
be.”314 This can be further exacerbated by the “illusion of control,” which
303
304
305
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308
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314
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Id.
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involves “the tendency to overestimate [one’s] ability to control events and
outcomes that are not within [one’s] control.”315 Though positive illusions
help legal professionals make decisions and serve their clients well, a
mistaken judgment of one’s true disposition can lead to undesirable
outcomes and missed opportunities.316 As most missteps come with
assurances of learning new insights about oneself or others, it is important
for attorneys, and even law students,317 to self-reflect and come to terms with
overconfidence or acknowledge when high confidence is misplaced.
Hindsight bias may provide an anchor for jurors and judges to determine
whether the facts of a case validate their conclusions. Hindsight bias occurs
when “people predicting the outcome of an event after the fact are more
certain that they would have predicted the actual outcome than are those who
attempt to predict in foresight.”318 Therefore, if people feel like they “knew it
all along,” that makes it difficult for them to determine whether their
judgments would have been “made in foresight.”319 One common example of
this in the practice of law is when a judge or juror evaluates “the
reasonableness of particular conduct” knowing that an adverse result has
occurred.320 The trier of fact evaluates the conduct with an eye toward
foreseeability or likelihood based on what has already occurred, thus leading
to hindsight bias.321 This is incredibly important in the practice of law
“[b]ecause hindsight bias makes such outcomes seem predictable,” and thus,
“this phenomenon makes it difficult” for judges and jurors to see the results
of another person’s conduct as unpredictable.322 Instead, people should look
at conduct from an unbiased perspective, while keeping in mind that “[i]n a
world where everyone ‘knew it all along,’ there is no incentive to learn and
very little left to learn.”323
4.

Decision-Making

Attorneys will spend most of their time making decisions for others. And
315

Id. at 69.
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317
Overconfidence among prospective law students is just as prevalent. For example,
“[p]rospective law students tend to be more confident about their own job prospects than
they are about their peers’ prospects.” Id. However, this overconfidence does not consider
the possibility that they might not make it past their first year of law school.
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though grueling to admit, those decisions may, at times, be based on lessthan-ideal grounds. One ground may include an attorney’s emotions.324
Though emotions may be difficult to manage or even articulate, they do
“provide useful information about [a] decision-maker’s values and
priorities,”325 which are often unexpressed. For example, knowing how the
opposition values specific interests during negotiations is a vital tool by
which to understand the opposition’s goals.326 Though “people are reasonably
accurate in predicting” their emotions at a point in the future, they are “not
very good at predicting the intensity or duration of these anticipated
emotions.”327 This is true because making a decision based on how people
might feel often precedes complete outcome satisfaction.
Thus, “[i]n similar ways, it can be difficult to predict our own behavior in
future circumstances.”328 For example, a study was done to evaluate how
women predict they will act when asked “sexually harassing interview
questions.”329 As it turned out, “women tend to anticipate that they will take
some kind of action to protest such questions, such as confronting . . . ,
refusing to answer . . . , or leaving the interview. But when actually asked
sexually harassing questions in an interview setting, most interviewees simply
answer[ed] the questions.”330
People are led to make such faulty predictions about their own emotions
and behaviors because of a lack of experience or inaccurate recollection of
how they reacted or behaved in a similar circumstance, making it difficult for
them to accurately predict how they might behave in the current situation.331
Hence, when coupled with emotion and our ability to predict our emotional
disposition over the course of any given situation, our decisions are made
absent full information. Thus, attorneys are left to conduct themselves as they
see others conduct themselves, or worse, act completely out of character.
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See ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 68, at 97.
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See generally Katie Shonk, Value Claiming in Negotiation: Prepare to Get Your Fair
Share with Value Claiming When Negotiating, HARV. L.: PROGRAM ON NEGOT. DAILY BLOG
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Id. (citing Julie A. Woodzicka & Marianne LaFrance, Real Versus Imagined Gender
Harassment, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 15 (2001); see also Janet K. Swim & Lauri L. Hyers, Excuse
Me—What Did You Just Say?!: Women’s Public and Private Responses to Sexist Remarks, 35 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 68 (1999)).
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Ethics

Though the ABA Model Rules currently provide a practical framework for
legal ethics, ethics can also be explained through social psychology. In the
words of Earl Warren, “In civilized life, law floats in a sea of ethics.”332 This
quip is more than a simple reflection, especially because “[l]awyers routinely
face a range of ethical and moral issues.”333 These issues are often found in
pressing situations, such as making decisions and formulating judgments.
Even though the ABA has gone to great lengths to ensure that officers of the
court and judges are given the tools, resources, and standards needed to be
effective and ethical attorneys, “many more situations implicate ethics or
morality in ways that may not register . . . consciously.”334 Psychology “helps
[to] explain how ethical lapses can occur more easily and less intentionally
than [people] might imagine.”335
a.

Bounded ethicality

Bounded ethicality occurs when “there are a range of ‘psychological
processes that lead people to engage in ethically questionable behaviors that
are inconsistent with their own preferred ethics.’”336 For example, many of us
have ethical blind spots.337 Blind spots occur when there “is a lack of
appreciation for the ethical tensions inherent in a particular decision or
course of action.”338 As a result, attorneys should take precautions when they
perceive that their decisions do not involve ethical issues, especially when
attorneys believe that any challenges they or their clients may face can be
easily resolved.339 This is closely related to dispositionist perceptions.340
People perceive themselves to be more objective and competent than they
actually are. When compared to others, “attorneys tend to believe that their
own ethical standards are more stringent than those of other attorneys.”341
332

Id. at 385.
ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 68, at 385.
334
Id.
335
Id.
336
Id. at 387 (quoting MAX H. BAZERMAN & DON A. MOORE, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL
DECISION MAKING 123 (7th ed. 2009)).
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See id.
338
Id.
339
See ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 68, at 387.
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See supra Section III.C.2.
341
See ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 68, at 387 (citing Jonathan R.B.
Halbesleben et al., The Role of Pluralistic Ignorance in Perceptions of Unethical Behavior: An
Investigation of Attorneys’ and Students’ Perceptions of Ethical Behavior, 14 ETHICS & BEHAV.
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These views keep attorneys from “thoughtfully consider[ing] . . . ethical
tensions,” which results in an unlikelihood of revisiting past decisions that
may have included an inability to properly “fix or otherwise manage ethical
problems.”342 Unfortunately, because no one “wants to be seen as weak,”343
attorneys are not motivated to thoughtfully reassess their own ethical
standards.
b.

The adversarial legal system

Many of the ethical dilemmas that attorneys face in the practice of law are
often attributed to the adversarial legal system.344 Unfortunately, “[i]n the
service of zealous advocacy” and in the context of ethical issues, “attorneys
may, among other things, fail to ask important or probing questions of their
client, fail to disclose material information, exaggerate claims, dissemble
about alternative deals, coach rather than prepare witnesses, and aggressively
cross-examine even candid witnesses.”345 Hence, “the adversary system can
incline lawyers to ‘treat[] behavior that would be ethically problematic in
other contexts as not problematic’”346 in the practice of law. These tendencies
may even be true of law students, considering that law school is unnecessarily
competitive and often adversarial. In the words of Justice Clarence Thomas,
law school is a “cauldron of competition.”347 Thus, “[a]cting in a way that
would provide an advantage to an opponent may [be] unthinkable,” but in
some circumstances, not disclosing certain information (that may seem like
an advantage) may be prejudicial to the administration of justice.348 Using
one’s “analytical skills . . . to excuse what others might see as unethical

17 (2004); Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: Institutional,
Professional, and Socio-Economic Factors That Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and
Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 773 (1998)). Comparing one’s
self to another is not exclusive to attorneys; it is also practiced by judges. For example, Judge
Richard A. Posner writes, “[w]e use introspection to acquit ourselves of accusations of bias,
while using realistic notions of human behavior to identify bias in others.” RICHARD A.
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 121 (2008).
342
ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 68, at 387–88.
343
Id. at 389.
344
See id. at 400–01.
345
Id. at 401.
346
Id. (quoting Austin Sarat, Ethics in Litigation: Rhetoric of Crisis, Realities of Practice, in
ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 145, 149 (Deborah
L. Rhode ed., 2000)).
347
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 372 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
348
See ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 68, at 401.
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conduct”349 is not a valid excuse. As former Justice Potter Stewart once said,
“[e]thics is knowing the difference between what you have a right to do and
what is right to do.”350
D.

Framing Misconduct Under Model Rule 8.4(d)

Given the various approaches states have adopted to maintain the integrity
of the profession and to determine whether conduct is prejudicial to the
administration of justice, a new supporting comment for paragraph (d)
should also incorporate various psychological theories. This would require
proscribed conduct to be framed in terms of situational and decision-making
influences—as found in the administration of justice or specifically within
the scope of judicial proceedings. Under dispositionism, framing misconduct
in terms of one’s objectively perceived actions would be too easy. Looking at
one’s behavior based on objective proclivities of character, such as
personality and preferences, may be cost-effective, efficient, and more
convenient; however, these objective proclivities do not accurately depict
one’s behavior as it truly occurs in the practice of law. Consequently, the
impact that situational influences or decision-making limitations have on an
attorney’s conduct and the underlying factors that compose the legal system
may help explain how conduct can become prejudicial to the administration
of justice.
1.

The Impact of Psychology on Attorneys and the Law

There is little doubt that the practice of law incorporates the science of
human behavior. Attorneys and judges constantly and inadvertently evaluate
people’s behavior to determine whether their own conduct is appropriate—
through comparison or by evaluating an appropriate standard of conduct.351
As attribution theory would suggest, dispositionism in light of situationism
may be the best way to understand when conduct becomes misconduct,
specifically when that conduct becomes prejudicial to the administration of
justice. Not only would objective and subjective concepts bring meaning to
an attorney’s conduct, but heuristics and predictions of emotions in decisionmaking processes may also bring meaning to an attorney’s conduct. Overall,
situationism, dispositionism, emotions, and heuristics may help determine
349

Id. at 402.
Id.; see also Bob Beckel & Cal Thomas, Common Ground: We Need an Ethics Check,
USA TODAY (Jan. 29, 2014, 6:24 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/01/29/politicians-ethics-mcdonnellindictment-scandal-lobbyists-column/5037593/.
351
See ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 68, at 387; see also supra note 341 and
accompanying text.
350
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when conduct becomes misconduct in the practice of law. Thus, it is worth
re-examining Winston, Cottingham, and McCool with these understandings
in mind.
a.

When might attorney conduct be prejudicial:
Winston and heuristics

“[P]rejudicial” means “[t]ending to harm, injure, or impair; damaging or
hurtful” or, alternatively, “[u]nfairly disadvantageous” or “inequitably
detrimental.”352 This Comment suggests that attorney conduct is prejudicial
whenever it tends to harm, injure, impair, damage, cause hurt, or unfairly
disadvantage another. However, prejudicial conduct does not exist or occur
in a vacuum. Evaluating misconduct requires substance, which often involves
the facts underlying an attorney’s misconduct, and may include situational
influences that give rise to an attorney’s conduct. An attorney’s
misjudgments of a situation or a client’s disposition are also at play.
Notwithstanding the potential dangers of judgment shortcuts, these
“efficient” judgments help attorneys make decisions. Therefore, it is
important to consider how cataloging previous experiences and making
decisions from those cataloged or predicted outcomes can harm clients and
lead to perceived attorney misconduct. For example, the attorney in Winston
misjudged his decisions during jury selection.353 According to the state postconviction court, “the defense lawyer used his [peremptory challenges] to
strike six men and one woman.”354 However, the post-conviction counsel
asserted that it “was not enough to support a claim of ineffective assistance,
because it proved that the lawyer had a strategic reason for his actions.”355
The strategic reason was to have an all-woman jury to favor the petitioner
since the attorney thought “the female jurors would be more critical of the
victim.”356 Instead, this decision harmed his client because the state postconviction court denied relief and “found that [not] striking the female jurors
was ‘trial counsel’s strategy’ and ‘reasonable under the circumstances.’”357
Though the petitioner’s allegations of prejudice were never fully proven, the
attorney’s strategy did little to avoid conviction. The Seventh Circuit noted
that “[c]alling the lawyer’s actions ‘strategic’ does not help” because wellestablished precedent “exists not only to protect the criminal defendant, but

352
353
354
355
356
357

Prejudicial, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
See Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d 618, 623–24 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id. at 623–24.
Id. at 624.
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also to protect . . . society’s interest in an unbiased system of justice.”358
The attorney’s alleged misconduct seemed to result from heuristics, which
led the petitioner to believe that the attorney engaged in prejudicial conduct.
In Winston, the petitioner’s counsel claimed to have made a deliberate and
systematic judgment to strike most of the male jurors. However, the
attorney’s judgment seemed to have also sprouted from his intuition.359
Because female jurors were critical of the victims in other cases, he thought
the female jurors he selected would also be critical of the petitioner’s alleged
victim. However, he miscalculated his judgment shortcut. Luckily for him,
his conduct was not prejudicial because of a state court “error,” which was
left undisturbed.
The attorney’s perceived error of misjudgment may have also resulted
from hindsight bias, where “people predicting the outcome of an event after
the fact are more certain that they would have predicted the actual outcome
than are those who attempt to predict in foresight.”360 Though the petitioner’s
attorney made the decision in foresight, the attorney attempted to predict the
outcome of the petitioner’s case in hindsight by considering other cases
involving female jurors. Thus, the petitioner’s attorney evaluated the
outcome of his decision with an eye toward foreseeability or likelihood, like
the way a judge or disciplinary committee may evaluate prejudicial conduct.
Judgment shortcuts and other predictive strategies hardly seem to constitute
misconduct. Though the attorney’s conduct may not have had a prejudicial
purpose, the conduct appeared to have had a prejudicial effect on the
outcome of the petitioner’s case. The prejudicial effect of the attorney’s
conduct was never fully proven because of a mischaracterization of asserted
claims. Consequently, the question becomes: Should attorneys be prohibited
from using intuition and strategic methods to advocate for their clients?
Certainly not. Otherwise, what would be left of the practice of law?
b.

When might attorneys be engaging in the
administration of justice: Cottingham and
situationism

“[D]ue administration of justice” means “[t]he proper functioning and
integrity of a court or other tribunal and the proceedings before it in
accordance with the rights guaranteed to the parties.”361 Facially, its scope is
limited. As such, the “administration of justice” should be defined in terms
of an attorney’s professional life and conduct throughout judicial
358
359
360
361

Id. at 631.
See ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 68, at 67.
Id. at 76.
Due Administration of Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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proceedings. This is not to say that attorney misconduct cannot occur outside
of judicial proceedings;362 however, for purposes of interpreting paragraph
(d), the administration of justice should be viewed in terms of an attorney’s
misconduct regarding its effect on the actual administration or adjudication
of judicial proceedings.363
As previously discussed, situationism “bases attributions of causation and
responsibility on unseen (though often visible) influences within [people]
and around [them].”364 Understanding that situational factors can influence
our behavior, and thus our conduct, is “vitally important because law is
centrally concerned with making attributions.”365 Further, situations that
attorneys encounter in the practice of law (specifically related to the
adjudication process) may help to explain why attorneys engage in
misconduct. Cottingham provides a clear example of how conduct may be
contrary to the proper administration of justice. The attorney in Cottingham
meant to vindicate a past wrong initiated by his neighbors, which led to a
violation of paragraph (d) based on his conduct during judicial
proceedings—not based on conduct aimed at his neighbors. It was the
repeated filings and conduct within the administration of justice that led to a
finding of misconduct. As outlined in this Comment, an attorney’s
professional life and conduct within the scope of judicial proceedings,
including honoring practice norms of a specific jurisdiction, characterize the
administration of justice.
Further, Cottingham showed that objective considerations are not always
a strong predictor of attorney misconduct. The attorney in Cottingham had
been practicing law since 1979.366 At the time Cottingham was decided, the
attorney “had no record of prior discipline.”367 How does a practicing
attorney of almost forty years, with no prior record of disciplinary issues, end
up suspended for eighteen months? Perhaps his neighbors should have never
removed those laurel bushes. Though facetious, the removal of the laurel
bushes is telling of his conduct and why he chose to embark on a five-yearlong dispute with his neighbors.368 Another important point is that he

362

See, e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Deremiah, 875 N.W.2d 728, 737 (Iowa
2016) (attorney domestic violence).
363
Washington has already distilled this distinction. See cases cited supra note 179 and
accompanying text.
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Benforado & Hanson, supra note 272, at 298.
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In re Cottingham, 423 P.3d 818, 820 (Wash. 2018).
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“represented himself pro se and [even] appeared as counsel for his wife.”369
He also represented himself before the Washington State Bar Association.370
Despite his forty-year stint absent misconduct, the removal of eight laurel
bushes amounted to “two lawsuits, four judicial appeals, two administrative
appeals, countless motions, years of delay, unnecessary and wasteful
expenditure of judicial resources, injury to his neighbors, . . . nearly $60,000
in sanctions,” and one violation of Washington Rule 8.4(d).371
Situationism suggests that people fall into bankruptcy “because of lost
jobs, divorce, or unforeseen medical costs”372 instead of proclivities of
character; similarly, situationism may help to explain how the attorney in
Cottingham fell into misconduct. Suggesting that the attorney engaged in
misconduct because of character proclivities would be completely inaccurate,
considering he had no outstanding issues prior to the court’s holding in 2018.
Although the trial court held that the attorney “adversely possessed 292.3
square feet” of his neighbor’s property,373 there may have been other personal
attachments to the laurel bushes that caused him to pursue what appeared to
be a vendetta for justice. This speculation may be true considering the
attorney’s course of action and his apparent frustration, especially after the
court condemned the land in favor of his neighbors. The attorney may have
intended that land for his family, or he may have planned to use that land to
supplement his retirement. Either way, the trial court’s holding was enough
to cause the attorney to engage in misconduct.
Despite these observations, determining whether attorney conduct is
misconduct, situational factors and external influences are not meant to
undermine or lessen attorney misconduct but instead are meant to encourage
a “totality of the circumstances” approach. Attorneys may not always make
decisions based on objective considerations or even objective reasoning.
Instead, attorneys may be led by situations that judges and disciplinary
bodies often consider when assessing whether an attorney’s conduct was
appropriate. Thus, attorney misconduct is more than just conduct. Just as the
trial judge equitably favored the neighbors in Cottingham, extending
equitable and deferential treatment to attorneys based on situational factors
is appropriate and just.

369
370
371
372
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Id.
See id.
Id. at 820, 825.
Benforado & Hanson, supra note 272, at 299.
In re Cottingham, 423 P.3d at 820.
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When might attorneys be engaged in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice: McCool,
decision-making, and ethics

Now that the contours of “prejudicial” and the “administration of justice”
have been established, along with a basic understanding of heuristics and
situationism, it is important to remember how these explanations help to
form a supporting comment for Model Rule 8.4(d). For example, Winston
shows that “prejudicial” conduct, absent a black letter rule and supporting
comment,374 can still be defined—if the claims fall within the Sixth
Amendment context. This Comment asserts that in Winston, the attorney’s
alleged “prejudicial” conduct was a result of heuristics, which most, if not all
attorneys are “guilty” of invoking. Further, Cottingham provides an example
of when an attorney is engaged in the “administration of justice,” absent a
supporting comment, but with black letter rules that distinguish between the
impact on persons versus the impact on the adjudication process.375
Therefore, this Comment proposes that the attorney’s conduct within the
administration of justice—filing copious motions and wasting judicial
resources—amounted to misconduct partly because of situational influences.
Finally, McCool illustrates that an attorney’s conduct can constitute conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, absent supporting
comments,376 but in light of well-developed case law.377 In sum, decisionmaking may involve “unbridled” emotions and pose other ethical dilemmas.
Decision-making, according to psychology, can involve several methods
and influences. For example, “information gathering” is a vital part of
decision-making but may not always lead to optimal conclusions because
“people tend to seek out and pay attention to confirming information to the
neglect of information that is contrary to their existing beliefs or
preferences.”378 Similarly, an attorney evaluating options is also influenced by
the “substance of those options” and “the way those options are presented,”

374

Wisconsin does not have a black letter rule or a supporting comment. See WIS. SUP.
CT. r. 20:8.4.
375
Though Washington does not have a supporting comment, it does have two black
letter rules that set out the distinctions of prejudicial conduct. See WASH. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 8.4.
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See LA. STATE BAR ASS’N. art. XVI § 8.4 (2018).
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See, e.g., In re McCool, 2015-0284 (La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 3d 1058; In re O’Dwyer, 20161848 (La. 3/15/17); 221 So. 3d 1; In re Evans, 2019-01461 (La. 12/10/19); 284 So. 3d 634; In re
Gill, 2015-1373 (La. 10/23/15); 181 So. 3d 669.
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not just by objective analyses.379 Avoiding a decision could be just as bad.380
Avoiding a decision may result from not properly structuring decisions that
incorporate various alternatives.381 Finally, as a practical matter, the practice
of law is often done in groups, which in turn influences individual decisionmaking processes.382 Despite these various decision-making methods and
influences, emotions also contribute to framing decisions.383 Acknowledging
the role emotions play in the decision-making process may be difficult
because emotions are often contrary to an objective analytical process;
nevertheless, emotions should still be addressed.
Several facts from McCool may help explain why the respondent’s conduct
was “unyielding” and why the respondent’s decision-making process led to
disbarment. First, the respondent was friends with the person involved in the
initial dispute.384 Second, the dispute involved child custody issues.385 Third,
the respondent’s friend accused her former husband of sexually abusing their
two children.386 Fourth, there were two proceedings pending in two separate
states.387 Consequently, the respondent’s actions were aimed at two separate
judges in two different states. If Judge Amacker had not stayed the
proceedings in the intrafamily adoption proceedings and declined to exercise
379

Id. at 88.
See id. at 100–02.
381
See id. at 102. Robbennolt and Sternlight highlight an excerpt of a letter that Benjamin
Franklin wrote to Joseph Priestley, which addressed some challenges involved in decisionmaking. Id. The letter highlighted the following:
380

When . . . difficult Cases occur, they are difficult, chiefly because while we
have them under Consideration, all the Reasons pro and con are not
present to the Mind at the same time; but sometimes one Set present
themselves, and at other times another, the first being out of Sight. Hence
the various Purposes or Inclinations that alternately prevail, and the
Uncertainty that perplexes us.
. . . And, tho’ the Weight of Reasons cannot be taken with the Precision
of Algebraic Quantities, yet, when each is thus considered, separately and
comparatively, and the whole view before me, I think I can judge better,
and am less likely to make a rash step.
Id. (quoting Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Priestley (Sept. 19, 1772),
https://franklinpapers.org/framedVolumes.jsp.).
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jurisdiction over the respondent’s motion for emergency custody, would the
respondent have taken the measures she took? It is hard to say. Though it is
interesting to note that the court in McCool explicitly stated that the
respondent was “unhappy with the various rulings made by Judge Gambrell
and Judge Amacker.”388 How did the Supreme Court of Louisiana know the
respondent was “unhappy”? Was it because the respondent drafted an online
petition entitled “Justice for [H] and [Z]”?389 Or was it because the respondent
specifically named Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker in the online
petition? Or was it because the respondent tweeted thirty separate messages
about the case in one day?390 Though it may be difficult to pinpoint the exact
moment in which the court acknowledged that the respondent’s unhappiness
was the driving force behind her postings, the respondent’s emotions—at
least as recognized by the court—had spilled over into her decision-making
process.
Similarly, it is difficult to know for certain whether the respondent
anticipated that her fight for justice, that is, “Justice for [H] and [Z],”391 would
end in disbarment. Though emotions themselves may be difficult to manage
or even articulate, they do “provide useful information about the decisionmaker’s values and priorities.”392 As outlined in McCool, the respondent’s sole
focus was to help her friend. Though the wisdom of respondent’s decision to
support her friend is arguable, her emotions led her to make decisions that
clearly communicated her priorities. But why does this matter? It matters
because, although people may believe that their decisions are based on
reasonable predictions or projections of how their emotions may cause them
to act in the future, the duration or even the extent of their emotions is not
as predictable.393 Thus, people’s decisions are based on inaccurate
calculations, though reasonable under the circumstances. This is true because
making decisions based on how one might feel often precedes complete
outcome satisfaction.
Consequently, the respondent may have based her decision on future
emotions, which in part, may have been influenced by her predictions about
the judges’ future actions. However, the respondent’s predictions were
wrong. Instead, “Judge Gambrell filed a complaint against [the] respondent
with the ODC,”394 which substantially frustrated the respondent’s initial
388
389
390
391
392
393
394

Id. at 2, 172 So. 3d at 1061 (emphasis added).
Id.
In re McCool, 2015-0284, p. 6 (La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 3d 1058, 1063.
Id. at 2, 172 So. 3d at 1061.
ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 68, at 97.
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decision. The respondent’s decisions—coupled with emotion and her
perceived ability to predict her emotional disposition throughout the
proceedings—were made absent full information. The respondent did what
any friend would do under the circumstances; yet the respondent’s actions
were inappropriate for an attorney who had practiced law for almost fifteen
years.395 Similarly, the judges’ emotions may have been subject to external
influences regarding the events that unfolded.396
Emotions are not inferior to other objective measures of decision-making.
In fact, the opposite may be true. Emotions help attorneys make reasonable
predictions about future emotional states, which lead them to make informed
decisions. However, the intensity and duration of the respondent’s, or even
the judges’, emotions could not have been anticipated. In fact, the entire
series of events may not have been intended by the respondent. It seemed
that the respondent’s “unhappy” disposition may have been due to her
perceptions of injustice. Nevertheless, as referenced in McCool, “a lawyer
actively participating in a trial, particularly an emotionally charged
[proceeding], is not merely a person and not even merely a lawyer.”397
Instead, an attorney “is an intimate and trusted and essential part of the
machinery of justice, an ‘officer of the court’ in the most compelling sense.”398
Even the four dissenting Justices in Sawyer acknowledged that attorneys are
confronted with emotionally taxing situations, and yet, the Justices did not
discount the possibility that emotions can help attorneys make decisions to
accurately forecast legal outcomes. 399
The McCool court concluded that the respondent violated Louisiana Rule
8.4(d).400 However, according to the respondent, the recommendations and
conclusions of the presiding Justices undermined the profession and
“ensure[d] that ‘justice’ w[ould] be whatever judges sa[id] it [was], regardless
of the law, ethics, or all the facts and circumstances that would otherwise

395
Nanine McCool, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Nanine_McCool#:~:text=McCool%20received%20a%20B.A.%20in,L
ouisiana%20State%20University%20in%202000 (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
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As it turned out, the respondent ran for election in the 22nd Judicial District, but “was
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She competed against [Judge] Dawn Amacker.” Id. Further, McCool was decided on June 30,
2015, only seven months after the respondent’s defeat in the primary. See In re McCool,
2015-0284 (La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 3d 1058.
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contradict them.”401 Bounded ethicality and the adversarial system may have
led the respondent to engage in conduct that was prejudicial to the
administration of justice. Attorneys and judges alike have ethical blind spots
that make them susceptible to sub-optimal conduct. Thus, attorneys are
cautioned to take reasonable measures to ensure that their actions are ethical,
especially when they doubt that their actions comport with the ABA Model
Rules and other principles of legal ethics. Ultimately, while the respondent
felt that the judges were not acting within reasonable ethical standards, the
respondent found herself acting outside those same boundaries. Or, perhaps,
the respondent felt that she needed to act with rigor and haste due to the
pressures of an adversarial system. If the respondent did not win, then
someone else would. Thus, it became a battle between protecting her friend’s
children and standing up against those that would get in her way—including
judges. The respondent made the following remark: “I have no interest in
practicing law in a profession that demands absolute deference to an
individual, rather than the law.”402
Ultimately, the respondent’s “social media blitz” resulted in conduct that
was prejudicial to the administration of justice because it forced the judges to
recuse themselves and seriously frustrated the court’s proceedings. Though
disbarment was ordered against the respondent for violating Louisiana Rule
8.4(d), the case resulted in a plurality decision.403 The court’s decision shows
that there are several extenuating circumstances that must be considered to
determine whether an attorney has violated Model Rule 8.4(d) and to
determine whether sanctions are appropriate.
2.

The Purpose of Professional Discipline

As it stands, what is good for the goose is good for the gander. What is
good for an attorney, is likely good for society. Though written with reference
to North Carolina Rule 8.4(b), which states, “[i]t is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects,”404
401

Debra Cassens Weiss, ‘Social Media Blitz’ in Custody Case Yields Possible Suspension
for Louisiana Lawyer, A.B.A. J.: LEGAL ETHICS (Feb. 17, 2015, 5:45 AM),
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Comment 3 reflects an impressive principle. According to Comment 3, “[t]he
purpose of professional discipline for misconduct is not punishment, but to
protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession.”405 Further, Comment
3 notes that “[l]awyer discipline affects only the lawyer’s license to practice
law.”406 Therefore, the legal profession should continue to learn from
attorney misconduct to improve the profession.
This Comment does not suggest that an attorney who fails to comport
with Model Rule 8.4(d), should be provided an excuse through psychological
theories. Instead, the point of this Comment is to highlight the impact that
psychology can have on understanding attorney misconduct, and how
psychology can help form a new supporting comment for paragraph (d).
Further, this Comment is neither meant to help attorneys avoid professional
discipline nor to enable attorneys to engage in misconduct. North Carolina’s
supporting comments are practical in that they provide a standard, pose
illustrations, and consider other aggravating circumstances;407 however,
North Carolina’s supporting comments do not include external influences
that an attorney may confront in the administration of justice. Yet Comment
5 recognizes how an attorney’s conduct or certain behavior can impact other
attorneys.408 For example, when prejudicial conduct such as threating,
bullying, harassing, and humiliating actions are “directed to opposing
counsel, such conduct tends to impede opposing counsel’s ability to
represent his or her client effectively.”409 Therefore, Comment 5
acknowledges that outside forces can have a negative impact on an attorney’s
conduct, and in extreme cases, may compel a prejudiced attorney to act out
of character and engage in similar misconduct. Comment 5 highlights the
following:
Comments “by one lawyer tending to disparage the
personality or performance of another . . . tend to reduce
public trust and confidence in our courts and, in more
extreme cases, directly interfere with the truth-finding
function by distracting judges and juries from the serious
business at hand.” State v. Rivera, 350 N.C. 285, 291, 514
S.E.2d 720, 723 (1999). See Rule 3.5, cmt. [10] and Rule 4.4,
cmt. [2].410
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Consequently, assessing attorney misconduct through external influences
not only ensures just outcomes, but also serves other attorneys, the
profession, and society.
Sanctions and attorney misconduct are often assessed with the public, the
profession, and the courts in mind. This is true because, as seen in McCool,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana not only parsed out when conduct is
prejudicial to the administration of justice, but it also provided a framework
to determine whether sanctions were appropriate. The court reasoned: “In
determining a sanction, we are mindful disciplinary proceedings are not
primarily to punish the lawyer, but rather are designed to maintain high
standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the
profession, and deter future misconduct.”411 Therefore, “[t]he discipline to be
imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the
offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.”412 In determining attorney sanctions, the court explained the
following:
[I]n imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer
misconduct, this Court shall consider four factors:
(1) whether the lawyer has violated a duty owed to a
client, to the public, to the legal system, or to the
profession;
(2) whether the lawyer acted intentionally,
knowingly, negligently;
(3) the amount of actual or potential injury caused
by the lawyer’s misconduct; and
(4) the existence of any aggravating or mitigating
factors.413
Just as North Carolina provides illustrations in its supporting comments and
the Supreme Court of Louisiana determines attorney sanctions, a new
supporting comment to Model Rule 8.4(d) should be composed of guiding
principles and references to external influences that help identify attorney
misconduct.
IV. A PROPOSED COMMENT IN SUPPORT OF MODEL RULE 8.4(d)
In the landmark case, Mistretta v. United States, one of the main goals of
411
412
413

In re McCool, 2015-0284, pp. 31–32 (La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 3d 1058, 1078.
Id. at 32, 172 So. 3d at 1078.
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the Sentencing Commission was “to reflect, to the extent practicable,
advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal
justice process.”414 As a result, it is not novel to incorporate advancements in
the knowledge of human behavior to better understand the justice system.
Similarly, Part IV is meant to reflect human behavior as it relates to attorney
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice by proposing a new
supporting comment to paragraph (d). Therefore, conceptualizing the
implications of human behavior in the administration of justice and
incorporating pragmatic approaches to underlying psychological
considerations—to better support Model Rule 8.4(d)—is central to achieving
a more comprehensive understanding of the practice of law. To make
impactful strides, the new supporting comment to Model Rule 8.4(d) should
be drafted to reflect human behavior as illustrated through situationism,
heuristics, decision-making practices, and general concepts of legal ethics.
Further, attorney discipline should not be aimed at punishing an attorney,
but instead should be focused on preserving the principles that help
attorneys, judges, and court personnel maintain the integrity of the
profession.
The 2016 ABA Report, and the current Model Rules, make clear that
though comments “use the term ‘should’ . . . [they] do not add obligations to
the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the
Rules.”415 Additionally, “the Comment accompanying each Rule explains and
illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule,” and is “intended as [a]
guide[] to interpretation,” not a means of authority.416 For some states,417
supporting comments do more to determine whether a rule has been violated
than the rule itself.
Model Rule 8.4(d)’s new supporting comment should read as follows:
A violation of paragraph (d) is invoked when an attorney’s
prejudicial conduct—which includes conduct that may be
attributed to an attorney’s professional life or within the scope
of judicial proceedings—results in substantial harm to the
justice system and should be read in terms of its procedural
effect in administering justice. Whether an attorney’s conduct
warrants the imposition of professional discipline under
414
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C)).
415
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See supra Section III.B.4.; see also supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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paragraph (d) should be determined by considering
situational or decision-making influences, such as extraneous
circumstances absent proclivities of character, inaccurate
predictions present in the decision-making process, conduct
resulting from perceived efficiencies, professional or public
interests, and any mitigating factors as determined by the
court. A showing of conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice must not only include conduct
seriously inconsistent with a substantial purpose to serve
anyone associated with the judicial process but must also
include adverse situational or decision-making factors
impacting an attorney’s conduct, as weighed by the
disciplinary body. Attorney discipline is not meant to punish
but to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession.
This supporting comment preserves paragraph (d) by honoring its true
purpose and provides paragraph (d) an opportunity to find new meaning.
V. CONCLUSION
May we dispel the myths of perfection and embrace faults with hopes that
accountability within the profession will be more than pointing fingers, and
instead, be a space where the legacy of our profession is lengthened by
trustworthiness, honesty, and integrity. In 1936, Jerome Frank, author of Law
and the Modern Mind, wrote:
The lay attitude towards lawyers is a compound of
contradictions, a mingling of respect and derision. Although
lawyers occupy leading positions in government and
industry, although the public looks to them for guidance in
meeting its most vital problems, yet concurrently it sneers at
them as tricksters and quibblers.
Respect for the bar is not difficult to explain. Justice, the
protection of life, the sanctity of property, the direction of
social control—these fundamentals are the business of the
law and of its ministers, the lawyers. Inevitably the
importance of such functions invests the legal profession
with dignity.
But coupled with a deference towards their function there
is cynical disdain of the lawyers themselves.418
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What does this mean for the profession? Does it mean that attorneys should
continue as they were because laypeople believe them all to be
“incorrigibles?” Certainly not. Instead, the legal profession ought to reflect
on the uncertainties within the practice of law, which may include various
considerations and explanations set forth in human and social psychology.
Put simply, lawyers are humans too, and not just gilded widgets of the
justice system. By “do[ing] away with legal mysteries”419 and by
acknowledging the basic attributions that laypeople confront every day,
attorneys may better understand when their conduct is prejudicial to the
administration of justice. Thus, the new supporting comment for Model Rule
8.4(d) should be read to incorporate the fallacies of human behavior because
the practice of law is itself full of uncertainty and naturally incorporates
essential parts of an attorney’s humanness.420 As paragraph (d) finds new
meaning, may the thoughts of former Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo be
remembered:
The law “must be satisfied to test the validity of its
conclusions by the logic of probabilities rather than the logic
of certainty.” . . . “Magic words and incantations are as fatal
to our science as they are to any other. . . . We seek to find
peace of mind in the word, the formula, the ritual. The hope
is an illusion. . . . Hardly is the ink dry upon our formula
before the call of an unsuspected equity—the urge of a new
group of facts, a new combination of events—bid us blur and
blot and qualify and even, it may be, erase.” “In our worship
of certainty we must distinguish between the sound certainty
and the sham, between what is gold and what is tinsel; and
then, when certainty is attained, we must remember that it is
not the only good; that we can buy it at too high a price; that
there is danger in perpetual quiescence as well as in
perpetual motion; and that a compromise must be found in
a principle of growth.”421
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